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Abstract—This paper proposes a highly secure DSWT (Discrete 
Stationary Wavelet Transform) domain image watermarking and 
digital signature algorithm. The algorithm is based on MECDH 
(Modified Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) key exchange protocol 
with more secure elliptic curves and SHA-512 AECDSA 
(Advanced Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm), both of 
which are derived from ECC (Elliptic Curves Cryptography) [1] 
with ECDLP known to be very difficult to solve. Meanwhile, the 
algorithm run on MIRACL (Multiprecision Integer and Rational 
Arithmetic C/C++ Library) becomes stronger. Theoretical 
analyses and experimental results show that the proposed 
algorithm is more secure and practical to protect the 
copyrights of multimedia digital works.  
 
Index Terms—AECDSA, ECC, MECDH, MIRACL, Signature 
Authentication, Watermarking.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Watermarking technology with enough imperceptibility, 
robustness and security is honored as the last defense line of the 
digital copyright protection. The scheme can resist normal 
operation as well as malicious attacks, and protect the 
copyrights and authenticate data integrity. Therefore, digital 
watermarking technology and products are widely and deeply 
researched and used. [2] proposed a multiple watermarking 
technique and made digital assets secure and undetectable by 
dividing a host image into two regions. It used LSB to insert the 
owner information in DWT-DFT domain with a circular 
watermark. [3] proposed a hybrid algorithm combining 
encryption and digital watermarking techniques which 
embedded a cryptographic watermark and the users data in the 
carrier image to provide confidentiality in telemedicine images 
exchanging.  
However, the security of traditional watermarking needs to 
be improved with currently powerful cryptography technology. 
Started in 1985, Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller put forward the 
concept of ECC scheme independently, without noticing the 
counterpart’s existence. Since then, an extensive and deep 
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research on its security and effectiveness has been carried out. 
Compared to RSA and Diffie-Hellman scheme, ECC with 
ECDLP has more advantages like higher security, faster 
calculating speed, less storage space, narrower transmission 
bandwidth, and deeper mathematical basis and theoretical 
research. So ECC has become the most powerful public-key 
mechanism algorithm for its superior security and wider 
application environment. Meanwhile, ECC also has its 
disadvantages and may be attacked by the well-known Pollard 
Rho algorithm [1]. [4] proposed a new method for image 
tamper detection in the spatial domain. It used authentication 
encrypted with pseudo random sequence generated by Jacobian 
elliptic map and then the authentication was embedded in the 
image.  
 The problem with [2] is that it didn’t use cryptography and 
authentication technology. Three verification tests were applied 
in [3].Firstly, ownership authentication with similarity between 
the extracted watermark and the original watermark. Secondly, 
integrity verification was employed by comparing the Hash 
value watermark and the Hash value of the received image’s 
ROI. Finally, tamper location was computed by comparing the 
CRC-16 value with the extracted CRC-16 value of the same 
block. But no professional and specific cryptography and 
digital signature technology are seen. [4] completed a new 
authentication method based on Jacobian elliptic map with 160 
bits key, which was lower robustness and small capacity and 
easily leaded to reducing the security of watermarking.  
To solve the above problem better, our paper proposes more 
secure algorithms based on MECDH and AECDSA to enforce 
its security and improve the security of watermarking with the 
newly proposed algorithms.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
introduces public-key mechanism with new algorithm based on 
MECDH and AECDSA. Section III mainly describes the 
proposed highly secure image watermarking and digital 
signature with newly proposed scheme. Experimental results 
and performance analyses are shown in section IV. Finally, we 
draw some conclusions and discuss the future work. 
II. PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY SCHEME WITH NEW 
ALGORITHMS BASED ON MECDH AND   AECDSA 
ECC has been proved to be a more efficient and powerful 
public-key cryptography scheme, which is based on ECDLP [5]. 
No algorithm has been found so far with the sub exponential of 
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2 
complexity [6]. However, with the deep and new application of 
ECC, some security problems such as ECDH key exchange 
protocol and Pollard Rho attack have been revealed gradually. 
Therefore, we put forward some more secure cryptography and 
signature algorithm based on MECDH and AECDSA 
implemented with MIRACL.  
A. The Selection of More Secure Elliptic Curves 
The security of ECC is on the basis of elliptic curve over 
finite fields. The elliptic curve with proper parameters is 
believed to be secure. The more difficult solution to ECDLP is, 
the more secure the elliptic curve is. The system parameters of 
secure elliptic curve are open in practice and the security of 
algorithm has nothing to do with the confidentiality of the 
parameters. So we’d better follow some essential rules so as to 
select more secure elliptic curves recommended by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)[7]. 
Because the ECC system in our paper studied at software level, 
the finite field is defined as a prime finite field, GF(p) or Fp.  
Let us explain how to choose system parameters for a secure 
elliptic curve by illustrating the E(GF(p)) formed by the points 
on an elliptic curve defined over a prime finite field.  
1) The system parameters of the E(GF(p))  expressed as 
y2=x3+ax+b(mod n) is commonly described as 
D=(p,a,b,G,n,h), where  a,bGF(p), p from GF(p) is a 
prime number,  G is the base point of the curve and the 
prime  n is the order of the point, h is a cofactor meeting 
the condition of  N=nh, N is the order of the curve, 
#E(GF(p)) determined by p, a and b. For being securer, 
all the parameters in an ECC application are open and 
required to satisfy the following conditions：The prime 
p>3. 
2) a<p, b<p, ab0, =4a3+27b20, (4a3+27b2) mod p0.  
3) n= max (2191, 4p1/2).  
4) h= [#E(GF(p))]/n, 1h4.  
5) gcd[p,p+1-#E(Fp)]=1 (Non-supersingular).  
6) p+1-2p1/2  #E(Fp) p+1+2p1/2 [9].  
7) #E(Fp)p (Non-anomalous).  
Among all the above parameters, n is the most important, for 
cryptographically random number and private-key are both 
taken values from (1, n-1). Thus the length of the ciphers in 
ECC is normally defined as the binary length of n, which is 
recommended to be no less than 163 bits [10]. In this paper, for 
higher security and more receivable response, we choose 192 
bits ciphers.  
B. MIRACL 
MIRACL is a big number library developed by Shamus 
Software Ltd., and is also the predecessor of the company with 
the same name as the library. The library not only implements 
all kinds of the primitives necessary to precisely arithmetical 
operations of big integer and fraction but also provides relevant 
algorithms of cryptography based on big number. With all its 
advantages, MIRACL is widely used in cryptography 
applications based on ECC. Furthermore, MIRACL runs at fast 
speed, because of some assembly code in its core. 
Therefore, we make full use of the professional big number 
library to improve the security and the efficiency of highly 
secure watermarking and authentication resolution proposed in 
the paper.  
C. MECDH (Modified Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman)  
The ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) widely used in 
Cryptosystems is the key exchange protocol based on ECC and 
Diffie-Hellman algorithm, but it is vulnerable to Pollard Rho 
attack. For the purposes of more security, this paper has 
modified the ECDH and generated the MECDH (Modified 
ECDH) key exchange algorithm.  
The scheme has been implemented in the following manner, 
which involves the uses of a more secure elliptic curve defined 
as E(GF(p)) with the parameters just like the form of  
D=(p,a,b,G,n,h) and MIRACL above. The MECDH between 
two parties, A and B, has been accomplished as follows. 
1) Initialization phase 
a) Initializing the MIRACL system for our application 
with the numbers of digits and the number base, here 
for 192 and 16 respectively.  
b) Initializing the system parameters,   D= (p,a,b,G,n,h), 
with GF(||p||=192) based on secure elliptic curves 
recommended by NIST.  
2) A randomly selects a big integer base on MIRACL, 
dA(1, n-1), as its private key. Then A computes the 
corresponding public key, PA=dA(G mod n), which is 
a point on  E(GF(p)). Finally A sends its public key, PA,  
to B.  
3) In the similar way, B randomly selects a big integer, 
dB(1,n-1), as its private key. Then B computes the 
corresponding public key, PB=dB(G mod n), which is 
also a point on E(GF(p)). Finally B sends its public key, 
PB, to A.  
4) A generates the secret key, K1=dAPB mod n. So does B, 
K2=dBPA mod n, Thus K= dAdB(G mod n)= K1= K2.  
5) A randomly selects a big integer as above, d(1, n-1),  
computes  K*=dK and sends it to B. So K* acts as the 
session secret key.  
Compared to the original ECDH key exchange algorithm, the 
MECDH above makes an attacker fail to get enough 
information to execute the Pollard Rho attack, and guarantees 
the new key exchange protocol to perform on unsecure channel.  
D. Cryptography with MECDH  
With MECDH key exchange protocol mentioned above, we 
can encrypt plaintext M to ciphertext. For simplicity, let’s 
continue with step C. 
1) B randomly selects a big integer as above, e(1, n-1), 
and computes C1=eK, C2=M+e K*, here M for 
plaintext,  sends  (C1,C2) to A. 
2) A receives (C1, C2) and computes M=C2-eK*= 
C2-e (dK) = C2-d (eK) = C2- dC1.  
Based on the MECDH key exchange protocol, the encryption 
and decryption processing above have improved the security of 
the original EC EIGamal[11] scheme,  with which the Pollard 
Rho attack could be employed to reveal the private key,  
leading to potential safety loophole any further.  
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E. AECDSA (Advanced Elliptic Curve Digital Signature 
Algorithm) 
AECDSA with 512 bits signature, implemented on ECC 
over  E(GF(p)) with  D=(p,a,b,G,n,h) above and on MIRACL, 
is the revised edition of the current ECDSA,  but more secure 
with stronger elliptic curves and more efficient with the 
MIRACL library.  
Let’s suppose message m to be signed to (m,r,s,t), which is 
regarded as digital signature to be authenticated.  
1) Initialization phase with MECDH above. 
 
2) Signature stage 
a) Randomly choose a big integer d(1, n-1), which 
meets the condition of gcd(d, n)=1, as private key,  
then compute public key, Q=dG,  and makes it 
public.  
b) Compute e=SHA-512(m) and w=H(e), where  
SHA-512 is a more secure hash function for 512 bits 
digest and e is the message digest in the form of 
MIRACL, w for Hamming weight of e and H for 
Hamming function. 
c) Select a big, random integer,  k(1, n-1) , which 
meets the condition of gcd(d, n)=1, then compute  
kG=(x1, y1),  r=x1 mod n, s=(wr+d-k) mod n. If r=0 or 
s=0 then repeat this step.  
d) Select a big,  random integer, λ(1, n-1) , which 
meets the condition of gcd(λ, n)=1,  then compute  
t=λm, if t=0 then repeat the step. 
e) Generate the signature (m,r,s,t). 
3) Authentication stage 
a) Judge the validity of the signature, (m,r,s,t). If (r, s) 
(1, n-1) then show that the signature is false.  
b) Compute e=SHA-512(m) and Hamming weight of e，
w, then repeat in the same way above.  
c) Compute X=(s-wr-λm+u)G +Q=kG=(x2,y2). If X=O 
then the signature is false else v=x2 mod n.  
d) If v=r then the signature is validity else invalidity.  
The AECDSA algorithm can not only resist kinds of attacks 
at the ECDSA scheme by forged signature like replacing 
message or random number, but also reduce the operating 
quantity. 
 
III. SECURE WATERMARKING ALGORITHM WITH NEW 
ALGORITHM BASED ON MECDH AND AECDSA 
Human Vision System (HVS) is playing an important role in 
image watermarking scheme. We use the HVS combined with 
newly proposed algorithms based on ECC and MIRACL to 
achieve our goal of ideal secure performance of the 
watermarking algorithm with better balance of invisibility and 
robustness.  
A. Images Preprocessing 
1) DSWT 
The major weakness of the classical DWT is that it can’t 
provide shift invariance on account of down-sampling of its 
sub-bands, which means DWT is not a time-invariant and leads 
to inaccurate extraction of the watermark embedded into a 
carrier image, possibly results in a poor extracted watermark.  
In order to solve the problem, we introduce the DSWT 
algorithm to this paper. DSWT is designed to aim at 
overcoming the lack of shift invariance of DWT by removing 
down-sampling and up-sampling of coefficients during each 
filter-bank iteration and up-sampling the filter coefficients by a 
factor of 2j in the j+1 level of the algorithm [12]. Since frame 
expansion increases robustness with respect to additive noise, 
images processing based on DSWT is more robust than that 
based on DWT [13].  
In this paper, a selected carrier image and a selected 
watermark image with DSWT is implemented by swt2 function 
running on MATLAB R2012b, performing swt2 decomposition 
of the carrier image I at level 2 for higher PSNR and the 
watermark image W at level 1, generating LL2 for 
approximation coefficients of the carrier image and LL for 
approximation coefficients of the watermark image 
respectively.  
2) SVD 
SVD is used to extract algebraic features from images. Both 
DSTW and SVD do benefit to HVS in the proposed 
watermarking algorithm.  
Let us suppose that A is a given gray-scale image represented 
in the form of m×n matrix with the data type of single in 
MATLAB environment,  the result of SVD transformation is 
described as follows: 
  A=UVT                                                                 (1) 
Here U is an mm single unitary matrix,  is an mn 
rectangular diagonal matrix with non-negative single values on 
the diagonal, and VT is an n×n single unitary matrix. The 
diagonal entries i,i of Σ are known as the singular values of A. 
SVD transformation efficiently reveals intrinsic algebraic 
properties of an image, where singular values relate to 
brightness of an image and singular vectors reflect geometry 
characteristics of an image [14]. Because singular values 
concentrate the main energy of an image and singular vectors 
have good stability and rotation invariance, both of them are 
useful for invisibility and robustness of the proposed 
watermarking scheme.  
In our paper, the image A in equation (1) is replaced by LL2 
and LL subband respectively, both of the subband are 
transformed according to SVD operation mentioned above. 
B. Embed Watermark and Generate Digital Signature 
The newly proposed secure watermarking embedding 
algorithm based on MECDH and AECDSA is implemented 
with DSWT and SVD in MATLAB environment. The 
algorithm illustration is shown in Fig. 1.  
 
Fig. 1 Watermark Embedding Algorithm 
The steps of watermark embedding and digital signature 
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complexity [6]. However, with the deep and new application of 
ECC, some security problems such as ECDH key exchange 
protocol and Pollard Rho attack have been revealed gradually. 
Therefore, we put forward some more secure cryptography and 
signature algorithm based on MECDH and AECDSA 
implemented with MIRACL.  
A. The Selection of More Secure Elliptic Curves 
The security of ECC is on the basis of elliptic curve over 
finite fields. The elliptic curve with proper parameters is 
believed to be secure. The more difficult solution to ECDLP is, 
the more secure the elliptic curve is. The system parameters of 
secure elliptic curve are open in practice and the security of 
algorithm has nothing to do with the confidentiality of the 
parameters. So we’d better follow some essential rules so as to 
select more secure elliptic curves recommended by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)[7]. 
Because the ECC system in our paper studied at software level, 
the finite field is defined as a prime finite field, GF(p) or Fp.  
Let us explain how to choose system parameters for a secure 
elliptic curve by illustrating the E(GF(p)) formed by the points 
on an elliptic curve defined over a prime finite field.  
1) The system parameters of the E(GF(p))  expressed as 
y2=x3+ax+b(mod n) is commonly described as 
D=(p,a,b,G,n,h), where  a,bGF(p), p from GF(p) is a 
prime number,  G is the base point of the curve and the 
prime  n is the order of the point, h is a cofactor meeting 
the condition of  N=nh, N is the order of the curve, 
#E(GF(p)) determined by p, a and b. For being securer, 
all the parameters in an ECC application are open and 
required to satisfy the following conditions：The prime 
p>3. 
2) a<p, b<p, ab0, =4a3+27b20, (4a3+27b2) mod p0.  
3) n= max (2191, 4p1/2).  
4) h= [#E(GF(p))]/n, 1h4.  
5) gcd[p,p+1-#E(Fp)]=1 (Non-supersingular).  
6) p+1-2p1/2  #E(Fp) p+1+2p1/2 [9].  
7) #E(Fp)p (Non-anomalous).  
Among all the above parameters, n is the most important, for 
cryptographically random number and private-key are both 
taken values from (1, n-1). Thus the length of the ciphers in 
ECC is normally defined as the binary length of n, which is 
recommended to be no less than 163 bits [10]. In this paper, for 
higher security and more receivable response, we choose 192 
bits ciphers.  
B. MIRACL 
MIRACL is a big number library developed by Shamus 
Software Ltd., and is also the predecessor of the company with 
the same name as the library. The library not only implements 
all kinds of the primitives necessary to precisely arithmetical 
operations of big integer and fraction but also provides relevant 
algorithms of cryptography based on big number. With all its 
advantages, MIRACL is widely used in cryptography 
applications based on ECC. Furthermore, MIRACL runs at fast 
speed, because of some assembly code in its core. 
Therefore, we make full use of the professional big number 
library to improve the security and the efficiency of highly 
secure watermarking and authentication resolution proposed in 
the paper.  
C. MECDH (Modified Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman)  
The ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) widely used in 
Cryptosystems is the key exchange protocol based on ECC and 
Diffie-Hellman algorithm, but it is vulnerable to Pollard Rho 
attack. For the purposes of more security, this paper has 
modified the ECDH and generated the MECDH (Modified 
ECDH) key exchange algorithm.  
The scheme has been implemented in the following manner, 
which involves the uses of a more secure elliptic curve defined 
as E(GF(p)) with the parameters just like the form of  
D=(p,a,b,G,n,h) and MIRACL above. The MECDH between 
two parties, A and B, has been accomplished as follows. 
1) Initialization phase 
a) Initializing the MIRACL system for our application 
with the numbers of digits and the number base, here 
for 192 and 16 respectively.  
b) Initializing the system parameters,   D= (p,a,b,G,n,h), 
with GF(||p||=192) based on secure elliptic curves 
recommended by NIST.  
2) A randomly selects a big integer base on MIRACL, 
dA(1, n-1), as its private key. Then A computes the 
corresponding public key, PA=dA(G mod n), which is 
a point on  E(GF(p)). Finally A sends its public key, PA,  
to B.  
3) In the similar way, B randomly selects a big integer, 
dB(1,n-1), as its private key. Then B computes the 
corresponding public key, PB=dB(G mod n), which is 
also a point on E(GF(p)). Finally B sends its public key, 
PB, to A.  
4) A generates the secret key, K1=dAPB mod n. So does B, 
K2=dBPA mod n, Thus K= dAdB(G mod n)= K1= K2.  
5) A randomly selects a big integer as above, d(1, n-1),  
computes  K*=dK and sends it to B. So K* acts as the 
session secret key.  
Compared to the original ECDH key exchange algorithm, the 
MECDH above makes an attacker fail to get enough 
information to execute the Pollard Rho attack, and guarantees 
the new key exchange protocol to perform on unsecure channel.  
D. Cryptography with MECDH  
With MECDH key exchange protocol mentioned above, we 
can encrypt plaintext M to ciphertext. For simplicity, let’s 
continue with step C. 
1) B randomly selects a big integer as above, e(1, n-1), 
and computes C1=eK, C2=M+e K*, here M for 
plaintext,  sends  (C1,C2) to A. 
2) A receives (C1, C2) and computes M=C2-eK*= 
C2-e (dK) = C2-d (eK) = C2- dC1.  
Based on the MECDH key exchange protocol, the encryption 
and decryption processing above have improved the security of 
the original EC EIGamal[11] scheme,  with which the Pollard 
Rho attack could be employed to reveal the private key,  
leading to potential safety loophole any further.  
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E. AECDSA (Advanced Elliptic Curve Digital Signature 
Algorithm) 
AECDSA with 512 bits signature, implemented on ECC 
over  E(GF(p)) with  D=(p,a,b,G,n,h) above and on MIRACL, 
is the revised edition of the current ECDSA,  but more secure 
with stronger elliptic curves and more efficient with the 
MIRACL library.  
Let’s suppose message m to be signed to (m,r,s,t), which is 
regarded as digital signature to be authenticated.  
1) Initialization phase with MECDH above. 
 
2) Signature stage 
a) Randomly choose a big integer d(1, n-1), which 
meets the condition of gcd(d, n)=1, as private key,  
then compute public key, Q=dG,  and makes it 
public.  
b) Compute e=SHA-512(m) and w=H(e), where  
SHA-512 is a more secure hash function for 512 bits 
digest and e is the message digest in the form of 
MIRACL, w for Hamming weight of e and H for 
Hamming function. 
c) Select a big, random integer,  k(1, n-1) , which 
meets the condition of gcd(d, n)=1, then compute  
kG=(x1, y1),  r=x1 mod n, s=(wr+d-k) mod n. If r=0 or 
s=0 then repeat this step.  
d) Select a big,  random integer, λ(1, n-1) , which 
meets the condition of gcd(λ, n)=1,  then compute  
t=λm, if t=0 then repeat the step. 
e) Generate the signature (m,r,s,t). 
3) Authentication stage 
a) Judge the validity of the signature, (m,r,s,t). If (r, s) 
(1, n-1) then show that the signature is false.  
b) Compute e=SHA-512(m) and Hamming weight of e，
w, then repeat in the same way above.  
c) Compute X=(s-wr-λm+u)G +Q=kG=(x2,y2). If X=O 
then the signature is false else v=x2 mod n.  
d) If v=r then the signature is validity else invalidity.  
The AECDSA algorithm can not only resist kinds of attacks 
at the ECDSA scheme by forged signature like replacing 
message or random number, but also reduce the operating 
quantity. 
 
III. SECURE WATERMARKING ALGORITHM WITH NEW 
ALGORITHM BASED ON MECDH AND AECDSA 
Human Vision System (HVS) is playing an important role in 
image watermarking scheme. We use the HVS combined with 
newly proposed algorithms based on ECC and MIRACL to 
achieve our goal of ideal secure performance of the 
watermarking algorithm with better balance of invisibility and 
robustness.  
A. Images Preprocessing 
1) DSWT 
The major weakness of the classical DWT is that it can’t 
provide shift invariance on account of down-sampling of its 
sub-bands, which means DWT is not a time-invariant and leads 
to inaccurate extraction of the watermark embedded into a 
carrier image, possibly results in a poor extracted watermark.  
In order to solve the problem, we introduce the DSWT 
algorithm to this paper. DSWT is designed to aim at 
overcoming the lack of shift invariance of DWT by removing 
down-sampling and up-sampling of coefficients during each 
filter-bank iteration and up-sampling the filter coefficients by a 
factor of 2j in the j+1 level of the algorithm [12]. Since frame 
expansion increases robustness with respect to additive noise, 
images processing based on DSWT is more robust than that 
based on DWT [13].  
In this paper, a selected carrier image and a selected 
watermark image with DSWT is implemented by swt2 function 
running on MATLAB R2012b, performing swt2 decomposition 
of the carrier image I at level 2 for higher PSNR and the 
watermark image W at level 1, generating LL2 for 
approximation coefficients of the carrier image and LL for 
approximation coefficients of the watermark image 
respectively.  
2) SVD 
SVD is used to extract algebraic features from images. Both 
DSTW and SVD do benefit to HVS in the proposed 
watermarking algorithm.  
Let us suppose that A is a given gray-scale image represented 
in the form of m×n matrix with the data type of single in 
MATLAB environment,  the result of SVD transformation is 
described as follows: 
  A=UVT                                                                 (1) 
Here U is an mm single unitary matrix,  is an mn 
rectangular diagonal matrix with non-negative single values on 
the diagonal, and VT is an n×n single unitary matrix. The 
diagonal entries i,i of Σ are known as the singular values of A. 
SVD transformation efficiently reveals intrinsic algebraic 
properties of an image, where singular values relate to 
brightness of an image and singular vectors reflect geometry 
characteristics of an image [14]. Because singular values 
concentrate the main energy of an image and singular vectors 
have good stability and rotation invariance, both of them are 
useful for invisibility and robustness of the proposed 
watermarking scheme.  
In our paper, the image A in equation (1) is replaced by LL2 
and LL subband respectively, both of the subband are 
transformed according to SVD operation mentioned above. 
B. Embed Watermark and Generate Digital Signature 
The newly proposed secure watermarking embedding 
algorithm based on MECDH and AECDSA is implemented 
with DSWT and SVD in MATLAB environment. The 
algorithm illustration is shown in Fig. 1.  
 
Fig. 1 Watermark Embedding Algorithm 
The steps of watermark embedding and digital signature 
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E. AECDSA (Advanced Elliptic Curve Digital Signature 
Algorithm) 
AECDSA with 512 bits signature, implemented on ECC 
over  E(GF(p)) with  D=(p,a,b,G,n,h) above and on MIRACL, 
is the revised edition of the current ECDSA,  but more secure 
with stronger elliptic curves and more efficient with the 
MIRACL library.  
Let’s suppose message m to be signed to (m,r,s,t), which is 
regarded as digital signature to be authenticated.  
1) Initialization phase with MECDH above. 
 
2) Signature stage 
a) Randomly choose a big integer d(1, n-1), which 
meets the condition of gcd(d, n)=1, as private key,  
then compute public key, Q=dG,  and makes it 
public.  
b) Compute e=SHA-512(m) and w=H(e), where  
SHA-512 is a more secure hash function for 512 bits 
digest and e is the message digest in the form of 
MIRACL, w for Hamming weight of e and H for 
Hamming function. 
c) Select a big, random integer,  k(1, n-1) , which 
meets the condition of gcd(d, n)=1, then compute  
kG=(x1, y1),  r=x1 mod n, s=(wr+d-k) mod n. If r=0 or 
s=0 then repeat this step.  
d) Select a big,  random integer, λ(1, n-1) , which 
meets the condition of gcd(λ, n)=1,  then compute  
t=λm, if t=0 then repeat the step. 
e) Generate the signature (m,r,s,t). 
3) Authentication stage 
a) Judge the validity of the signature, (m,r,s,t). If (r, s) 
(1, n-1) then show that the signature is false.  
b) Compute e=SHA-512(m) and Hamming weight of e，
w, then repeat in the same way above.  
c) Compute X=(s-wr-λm+u)G +Q=kG=(x2,y2). If X=O 
then the signature is false else v=x2 mod n.  
d) If v=r then the signature is validity else invalidity.  
The AECDSA algorithm can not only resist kinds of attacks 
at the ECDSA scheme by forged signature like replacing 
message or random number, but also reduce the operating 
quantity. 
 
III. SECURE WATERMARKING ALGORITHM WITH NEW 
ALGORITHM BASED ON MECDH AND AECDSA 
Human Vision System (HVS) is playing an important role in 
image watermarking scheme. We use the HVS combined with 
newly proposed algorithms based on ECC and MIRACL to 
achieve our goal of ideal secure performance of the 
watermarking algorithm with better balance of invisibility and 
robustness.  
A. Images Preprocessing 
1) DSWT 
The major weakness of the classical DWT is that it can’t 
provide shift invariance on account of down-sampling of its 
sub-bands, which means DWT is not a time-invariant and leads 
to inaccurate extraction of the watermark embedded into a 
carrier image, possibly results in a poor extracted watermark.  
In order to solve the problem, we introduce the DSWT 
algorithm to this paper. DSWT is designed to aim at 
overcoming the lack of shift invariance of DWT by removing 
down-sampling and up-sampling of coefficients during each 
filter-bank iteration and up-sampling the filter coefficients by a 
factor of 2j in the j+1 level of the algorithm [12]. Since frame 
expansion increases robustness with respect to additive noise, 
images processing based on DSWT is more robust than that 
based on DWT [13].  
In this paper, a selected carrier image and a selected 
watermark image with DSWT is implemented by swt2 function 
running on MATLAB R2012b, performing swt2 decomposition 
of the carrier image I at level 2 for higher PSNR and the 
watermark image W at level 1, generating LL2 for 
approximation coefficients of the carrier image and LL for 
approximation coefficients of the watermark image 
respectively.  
2) SVD 
SVD is used to extract algebraic features from images. Both 
DSTW and SVD do benefit to HVS in the proposed 
watermarking algorithm.  
Let us suppose that A is a given gray-scale image represented 
in the form of m×n matrix with the data type of single in 
MATLAB environment,  the result of SVD transformation is 
described as follows: 
  A=UVT                                                                 (1) 
Here U is an mm single unitary matrix,  is an mn 
rectangular diagonal matrix with non-negative single values on 
the diagonal, and VT is an n×n single unitary matrix. The 
diagonal entries i,i of Σ are known as the singular values of A. 
SVD transformation efficiently reveals intrinsic algebraic 
properties of an image, where singular values relate to 
brightness of an image and singular vectors reflect geometry 
characteristics of an image [14]. Because singular values 
concentrate the main energy of an image and singular vectors 
have good stability and rotation invariance, both of them are 
useful for invisibility and robustness of the proposed 
watermarking scheme.  
In our paper, the image A in equation (1) is replaced by LL2 
and LL subband respectively, both of the subband are 
transformed according to SVD operation mentioned above. 
B. Embed Watermark and Generate Digital Signature 
The newly proposed secure watermarking embedding 
algorithm based on MECDH and AECDSA is implemented 
with DSWT and SVD in MATLAB environment. The 
algorithm illustration is shown in Fig. 1.  
 
Fig. 1 Watermark Embedding Algorithm 
The steps of watermark embedding and digital signature 
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corresponding data. 
Fig. 5 (a) Original Watermark           (b) Extracted Watermark（σ=0.1,
correlation coefficient=0.9974）
Fig. 6 (a) Original Watermark           (b) Extracted Watermark（σ=0.01,
correlation coefficient=0.9917）
To verify the robustness of the newly-proposed algorithm,
we only test median-filtering attack and 45o-rotation attack 
against the algorithm due to space limitations as Fig. 7. ~ 10. . The 
results of the algorithm have turned out to be robust despite 
some kinds of attacks. 
Fig. 7 Median-filtering Attack（σ=0.1, correlation coefficient=0.9748）
  (a) Original Watermark                                     (b) Extracted Watermark 
Fig. 8 Median-filtering Attack（σ=0.01, correlation coefficient=0.6134）
 (a) Original Watermark                            (b) Extracted Watermark 
Fig. 9 45 o -Rotation Attack（σ=0. 1, correlation coefficient=0.3724）
 (a) Original Watermark                    (b) Extracted Watermark 
Fig. 10 45o-Rotation Attack（σ=0.01, correlation coefficient=0.3069）
        (a) Original Watermark                            (b) Extracted Watermark 
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a highly secure watermarking and digital 
signature authentication scheme with the improved MECDH 
and AECDSA algorithm running on MIRACL, which is 
implemented with DSWT and SVD. Both theoretical analyses
and experimental results show that the proposed watermarking 
scheme with digital signature is more secure and efficient,
authentic to protect digital copyrights,  and is conforming to 
HVS with good invisibility and robustness.  In next step we 
wish to implement quantitative analyses in the watermarking 
algorithm performances against all kinds of attacks, and to 
compute some elliptic curve with better performance over Fp. 
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E. AECDSA (Advanced Elliptic Curve Digital Signature 
Algorithm) 
AECDSA with 512 bits signature, implemented on ECC 
over  E(GF(p)) with  D=(p,a,b,G,n,h) above and on MIRACL, 
is the revised edition of the current ECDSA,  but more secure 
with stronger elliptic curves and more efficient with the 
MIRACL library.  
Let’s suppose message m to be signed to (m,r,s,t), which is 
regarded as digital signature to be authenticated.  
1) Initialization phase with MECDH above. 
 
2) Signature stage 
a) Randomly choose a big integer d(1, n-1), which 
meets the condition of gcd(d, n)=1, as private key,  
then compute public key, Q=dG,  and makes it 
public.  
b) Compute e=SHA-512(m) and w=H(e), where  
SHA-512 is a more secure hash function for 512 bits 
digest and e is the message digest in the form of 
MIRACL, w for Hamming weight of e and H for 
Hamming function. 
c) Select a big, random integer,  k(1, n-1) , which 
meets the condition of gcd(d, n)=1, then compute  
kG=(x1, y1),  r=x1 mod n, s=(wr+d-k) mod n. If r=0 or 
s=0 then repeat this step.  
d) Select a big,  random integer, λ(1, n-1) , which 
meets the condition of gcd(λ, n)=1,  then compute  
t=λm, if t=0 then repeat the step. 
e) Generate the signature (m,r,s,t). 
3) Authentication stage 
a) Judge the validity of the signature, (m,r,s,t). If (r, s) 
(1, n-1) then show that the signature is false.  
b) Compute e=SHA-512(m) and Hamming weight of e，
w, then repeat in the same way above.  
c) Compute X=(s-wr-λm+u)G +Q=kG=(x2,y2). If X=O 
then the signature is false else v=x2 mod n.  
d) If v=r then the signature is validity else invalidity.  
The AECDSA algorithm can not only resist kinds of attacks 
at the ECDSA scheme by forged signature like replacing 
message or random number, but also reduce the operating 
quantity. 
 
III. SECURE WATERMARKING ALGORITHM WITH NEW 
ALGORITHM BASED ON MECDH AND AECDSA 
Human Vision System (HVS) is playing an important role in 
image watermarking scheme. We use the HVS combined with 
newly proposed algorithms based on ECC and MIRACL to 
achieve our goal of ideal secure performance of the 
watermarking algorithm with better balance of invisibility and 
robustness.  
A. Images Preprocessing 
1) DSWT 
The major weakness of the classical DWT is that it can’t 
provide shift invariance on account of down-sampling of its 
sub-bands, which means DWT is not a time-invariant and leads 
to inaccurate extraction of the watermark embedded into a 
carrier image, possibly results in a poor extracted watermark.  
In order to solve the problem, we introduce the DSWT 
algorithm to this paper. DSWT is designed to aim at 
overcoming the lack of shift invariance of DWT by removing 
down-sampling and up-sampling of coefficients during each 
filter-bank iteration and up-sampling the filter coefficients by a 
factor of 2j in the j+1 level of the algorithm [12]. Since frame 
expansion increases robustness with respect to additive noise, 
images processing based on DSWT is more robust than that 
based on DWT [13].  
In this paper, a selected carrier image and a selected 
watermark image with DSWT is implemented by swt2 function 
running on MATLAB R2012b, performing swt2 decomposition 
of the carrier image I at level 2 for higher PSNR and the 
watermark image W at level 1, generating LL2 for 
approximation coefficients of the carrier image and LL for 
approximation coefficients of the watermark image 
respectively.  
2) SVD 
SVD is used to extract algebraic features from images. Both 
DSTW and SVD do benefit to HVS in the proposed 
watermarking algorithm.  
Let us suppose that A is a given gray-scale image represented 
in the form of m×n matrix with the data type of single in 
MATLAB environment,  the result of SVD transformation is 
described as follows: 
  A=UVT                                                                 (1) 
Here U is an mm single unitary matrix,  is an mn 
rectangular diagonal matrix with non-negative single values on 
the diagonal, and VT is an n×n single unitary matrix. The 
diagonal entries i,i of Σ are known as the singular values of A. 
SVD transformation efficiently reveals intrinsic algebraic 
properties of an image, where singular values relate to 
brightness of an image and singular vectors reflect geometry 
characteristics of an image [14]. Because singular values 
concentrate the main energy of an image and singular vectors 
have good stability and rotation invariance, both of them are 
useful for invisibility and robustness of the proposed 
watermarking scheme.  
In our paper, the image A in equation (1) is replaced by LL2 
and LL subband respectively, both of the subband are 
transformed according to SVD operation mentioned above. 
B. Embed Watermark and Generate Digital Signature 
The newly proposed secure watermarking embedding 
algorithm based on MECDH and AECDSA is implemented 
with DSWT and SVD in MATLAB environment. The 
algorithm illustration is shown in Fig. 1.  
 
Fig. 1 Watermark Embedding Algorithm 
The steps of watermark embedding and digital signature 
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generating algorithm are described as follows: 
1) Apply DSWT at level 2 to the carrier image to 
decompose it into LL2, HL2, LH2, HH2 sub-bands, and 
apply SVD transformation to LL2 to generate its 
diagonal matrix ’.  
2) Apply DSWT at level 1 to the watermark image to 
decompose it into LL, HL, LH, HH sub-bands, and 
apply SVD transformation to LL to generate its 
diagonal matrix .  
3) Modify the singular values of the carrier image with the 
singular values of watermark image based on the 
following expression:  
 Iw=’+σ                                                                                  （2）
Where Iw stands for the watermarked image, σ for 
embedding intensity coefficient.  
4) Encrypt position parameters with MECDH algorithm 
based on MIRACL.  
(m1||m2) are encrypted to 192-bit (C1, C2) in the form of 
hexadecimal, where m1 stands for the starting position and
m2 for number of embedding coefficients.  
5) Generate 512-bit digital signature (m,r,s,t) based on the 
AECDSA.  
6) Apply inverse SVD and DSWT to the transformed 
carrier image to reconstruct the watermark-embedded 
image.  
C. Extract Watermark and Authenticate Digital Signature 
with MECDH and AECDSA 
The proposed secure watermark extracting algorithm based 
on MECDH and AECDSA is implemented with DSWT and 
SVD in MATLAB environment. The algorithm illustration is 
shown in Fig. 2.  The meanings of the parameters are listed 
above. As an exception, W’’ stands for the extracted watermark 
image and W’ for reconstructed watermark image based on W’’.
Fig. 2 Watermark Extracting Algorithm 
The steps of watermark extracting and authenticating digital 
signature algorithm based on AECDSA are an inverse process 
B simply described as follows:  
1) Apply DSWT2 and SVD transformation to I’w to 
generate I’’w.  
2) Apply DSWT2 and SVD transformation to I to 
generate’.  
3) Decrypt encrypted position parameters (C1, C2) to (m1, 
m2) based on the corresponding algorithm above.  
4) Extract the singular values from the watermarked 
image according to the following formula:  
W’’= (I’’w - ’ )                                (3)
5) Apply inverse SVD and DSWT to W’’ to obtain the 
extracted watermark image, W’.  
6) Authenticate the digital signature shown in Fig. 3. 
Fig. 3 Digital Signature Authenticate 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This paper has proposed a more secure image watermarking 
algorithm based on MECDH and AECDSA, the algorithm has 
been implemented in MATLAB R2012b with DSWT and SVD,
calling DLL (Dynamic Linked Library) generated in Microsoft 
Visual Studio 2010 with MIRACL. The main results of our 
applications to the new algorithm are illustrated as follows:  
Fig. 4   (a) Original Image         (b) Watermarked Image（σ=0.1, PSNR=45.17）
Fig. 5   (a) Original Image         (b) Watermarked Image（σ=0.01, PSNR=64.80）
On the basis of the subjective evaluation, the original and 
watermarked images are shown in Fig. 4. Let us pay more 
attention to the objective evaluation criterion, PSNR, an 
approximation to human perception of reconstruction quality. 
A higher PSNR value normally means higher quality of 
reconstruction. The typical PSNR value for distorted images 
and videos are between 30 and 50 dB. Provided the bit depth is 
8 bit, normally, the higher value of PSNR and the better 
performance for the algorithm.  
Together with the subjective evaluation shown as Fig. 4&5,
and PSNR values is 64.80 to 45.17 dB with σ(0.01,0.1), by 
which the invisibility of the final image embedded with the 
watermark image is effective,  and the similarity of the original 
carrier image and the watermarked image is high. So the result 
of the proposed algorithm is more robust, more secure and 
better than that of [4] with 44.12 dB, [2] didn’t mentioned it, 
but lower than the PSNR in [3] without professional and 
specific cryptography and digital signature technology. 
In this paper, with the subjective evaluation shown as Fig. 
6&7, the correlation coefficient between the original watermark 
image and the extracted one is 0.9974 to 0.9917, which means 
the close correlation between them. [2~4] didn’t mention the 
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apply SVD transformation to LL2 to generate its 
diagonal matrix ’.  
2) Apply DSWT at level 1 to the watermark image to 
decompose it into LL, HL, LH, HH sub-bands, and 
apply SVD transformation to LL to generate its 
diagonal matrix .  
3) Modify the singular values of the carrier image with the 
singular values of wat rmark imag  based on t  
following expression:  
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Where Iw stands for the watermarked image, σ for 
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with MECDH nd AECDSA 
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on MECDH and AECDSA is implemented with DSWT an  
SVD in MATLAB environment. The algorithm illustration is 
shown in Fig. 2.  The meanings of the parameters are listed 
ab ve. As an exception, W’’ stands for the extract d wat rmark 
imag  and W’ for rec structed watermark image based on W’’.
Fig. 2 Watermark Extracting Algorithm 
The steps of watermark extracting and authenticating digital 
signature alg rithm based on AECDSA are an inverse process 
B simply described as follows:  
1) Apply DSWT2 and SVD transformation to I’w to 
generate I’’w.  
2) Apply DSWT2 and SVD transformation to I to 
generate’.  
3) Decrypt encrypted position parameters (C1, C2) to (m1, 
m2) based on the corresp ding algorithm above.  
4) Extract the singular values from the watermarked 
image according to the following formula:  
W’’= (I’’w - ’ )                                (3)
5) Apply inverse SVD and DSWT to W’’ to obtain the 
extracted wat rmark image, W’.  
6) Authenticate the digital signature shown in Fig. 3. 
Fig. 3 Digital Signature Authenticate 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This paper has proposed a more secure image watermarking 
algorithm based on MECDH and AECDSA, the algorithm has 
been implemented in MATLAB R2012b with DSWT and SVD,
calling DLL (Dynamic Linked Library) generated in Microsoft 
Visual Studio 2010 with MIRACL. The main results of our 
applications to the ne  algorithm are illustrated as follows:  
Fig. 4   (a) Original Image         (b) Watermarked Image（σ=0.1, PSNR=45.17）
Fig. 5   (a) Original Image         (b) Watermarked Image（σ=0.01, PSNR=64.80）
On the basis of the subjective evaluation, the original and 
watermarked images are shown in Fig. 4. Let us pay more 
attention to the objective evaluation criterion, PSNR, an 
approximation to human perception f reconstruction quality. 
A higher PSNR value normally means higher quality of 
reconstruction. The typical PSNR value for distorted images 
and videos are between 30 and 50 dB. Provide  the bit depth is 
8 bit, n rmally, the higher value of PSNR and the better 
performance for the algorithm.  
T gether with the subjective evaluation shown as Fig. 4&5,
and PSNR values is 64.80 to 45.17 dB wit  σ(0.01,0.1), by 
which the invisibility of the final image embedded with the 
atermark image is effectiv ,  a d the similarity of the original 
carrier image and the watermarked image is high. So the result 
of the proposed algorithm is more robust, more secure and 
better than that of [4] with 44.12 dB, [2] didn’t mentioned it, 
ut lower t an the PSNR in [3] without professional and 
specific cryptography and digital signature technology. 
In this paper, with the subjective evaluation sh wn as Fig. 
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image and the extracted one is 0.9974 to 0.9917, which means 
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corresponding d ta. 
Fig. 5 (a) Original Watermark           (b) Extracted Watermark（σ=0.1,
correlation coefficient=0.9974）
Fig. 6 (a) Original Watermark           (b) Extracted Watermark（σ=0.01,
correlation coefficient=0.9917）
To verify the robustness of the newly-proposed algorithm,
we only test median-filtering attack and 45o-rotation attack 
against the algorithm due to space limitations as Fig. 7. ~ 10. . The 
results of the algorithm have turned out to be robust despite 
some kinds of attacks. 
Fig. 7 Median-filtering Attack（σ=0.1, correlation coefficient=0.9748）
  (a) Original Watermark                                     (b) Extracted Watermark 
Fig. 8 Median-filtering Attack（σ=0.01, correlation coefficient=0.6134）
 (a) Original Watermark                            (b) Extracted Watermark 
Fig. 9 45 o -Rotation Attack（σ=0. 1, correlation coefficient=0.3724）
 (a) Original Watermark                    (b) Extracted Watermark 
Fig. 10 45o-Rotation Attack（σ=0.01, correlation coefficient=0.3069）
        (a) Original Watermark                            (b) Extracted Watermark 
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a highly secure watermarking and digital 
signature authentication scheme with the improved MECDH 
and AECDSA algorithm running on MIRACL, which is 
implemented with DSWT and SVD. Both theoretical analyses
and experimental results show that the proposed watermarking 
scheme with digital signature is more secure and efficient,
authentic to protect digital copyrights,  and is conforming to 
HVS with good invisibility and robustness.  In next step we 
wish to implement quantitative analyses in the watermarking 
algorithm performances against all kinds of attacks, and to 
compute some elliptic curve with better performance over Fp. 
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generating algorithm are described as follows: 
1) Apply DSWT at level 2 to the carrier image to 
decompose it into LL2, HL2, LH2, HH2 sub-bands, and 
apply SVD transformation to LL2 to generate its 
diagonal matrix ’.  
2) Apply DSWT at level 1 to the watermark image to 
decompose it into LL, HL, LH, HH sub-bands, and 
apply SVD transformation to LL to generate its 
diagonal matrix .  
3) Modify the singular values of the carrier image with the 
singular values of watermark image based on the 
following expression:  
 Iw=’+σ                                                                                  （2）
Where Iw stands for the watermarked image, σ for 
embedding intensity coefficient.  
4) Encrypt position parameters with MECDH algorithm 
based on MIRACL.  
(m1||m2) are encrypted to 192-bit (C1, C2) in the form of 
hexadecimal, where m1 stands for the starting position and
m2 for number of embedding coefficients.  
5) Generate 512-bit digital signature (m,r,s,t) based on the 
AECDSA.  
6) Apply inverse SVD and DSWT to the transformed 
carrier image to reconstruct the watermark-embedded 
image.  
C. Extract Watermark and Authenticate Digital Signature 
with MECDH and AECDSA 
The proposed secure watermark extracting algorithm based 
on MECDH and AECDSA is implemented with DSWT and 
SVD in MATLAB environment. The algorithm illustration is 
shown in Fig. 2.  The meanings of the parameters are listed 
above. As an exception, W’’ stands for the extracted watermark 
image and W’ for reconstructed watermark image based on W’’.
Fig. 2 Watermark Extracting Algorithm 
The steps of watermark extracting and authenticating digital 
signature algorithm based on AECDSA are an inverse process 
B simply described as follows:  
1) Apply DSWT2 and SVD transformation to I’w to 
generate I’’w.  
2) Apply DSWT2 and SVD transformation to I to 
generate’.  
3) Decrypt encrypted position parameters (C1, C2) to (m1, 
m2) based on the corresponding algorithm above.  
4) Extract the singular values from the watermarked 
image according to the following formula:  
W’’= (I’’w - ’ )                                (3)
5) Apply inverse SVD and DSWT to W’’ to obtain the 
extracted watermark image, W’.  
6) Authenticate the digital signature shown in Fig. 3. 
Fig. 3 Digital Signature Authenticate 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This paper has proposed a more secure image watermarking 
algorithm based on MECDH and AECDSA, the algorithm has 
been implemented in MATLAB R2012b with DSWT and SVD,
calling DLL (Dynamic Linked Library) generated in Microsoft 
Visual Studio 2010 with MIRACL. The main results of our 
applications to the new algorithm are illustrated as follows:  
Fig. 4   (a) Original Image         (b) Watermarked Image（σ=0.1, PSNR=45.17）
Fig. 5   (a) Original Image         (b) Watermarked Image（σ=0.01, PSNR=64.80）
On the basis of the subjective evaluation, the original and 
watermarked images are shown in Fig. 4. Let us pay more 
attention to the objective evaluation criterion, PSNR, an 
approximation to human perception of reconstruction quality. 
A higher PSNR value normally means higher quality of 
reconstruction. The typical PSNR value for distorted images 
and videos are between 30 and 50 dB. Provided the bit depth is 
8 bit, normally, the higher value of PSNR and the better 
performance for the algorithm.  
Together with the subjective evaluation shown as Fig. 4&5,
and PSNR values is 64.80 to 45.17 dB with σ(0.01,0.1), by 
which the invisibility of the final image embedded with the 
watermark image is effective,  and the similarity of the original 
carrier image and the watermarked image is high. So the result 
of the proposed algorithm is more robust, more secure and 
better than that of [4] with 44.12 dB, [2] didn’t mentioned it, 
but lower than the PSNR in [3] without professional and 
specific cryptography and digital signature technology. 
In this paper, with the subjective evaluation shown as Fig. 
6&7, the correlation coefficient between the original watermark 
image and the extracted one is 0.9974 to 0.9917, which means 
the close correlation between them. [2~4] didn’t mention the 
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Privacy Preserving Data Aggregation over Multi-hop
Networks
Szilvia Lestyán
Abstract—We present a novel privacy-preserving data aggre-
gation protocol in wireless networks composed of short-range
devices. These devices provide a collaborative service and conduct
privacy-preserving computations to obtain the aggregated result
of their secret inputs. Our solution uses secure multi-party
primitives as well as a new distributed perturbation technique
to guarantee strong differential privacy against untrustworthy
aggregators.
Keywords—Privacy Preserving Data Mining, Secure Multiparty
Computation, Differential Privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
Although Internet is the prevalent communication network
today connecting billions of different devices worldwide, there
are still several practical cases where Internet connectivity is
scarce and expensive, such as surveillance and monitoring of
rural areas. In such applications, multi-hop wireless networks
using short-range communications still provide a cheaper and
compelling alternative to a global networking infrastructure.
For example, wireless sensor networks are deployed for the
purpose of monitoring agricultural areas in order to facilitate
more responsive intervention and to optimise maintenance
tasks with the aim to increase productivity [1]. However, differ-
ent producers can compete with each other, and hence security,
and in particular, confidentiality is of primary concern.
As a motivational scenario, consider vineyards1 where sen-
sors measure different regional characteristics such as the
pH of the soil or its mineral composition. Across a large
territory, there are several wineries, where winemakers use
different types of fertilisers for their field. The composition
of fertilisers is considered as trade secret among winemakers,
thus revealing some characteristics of the soil can also reveal
this confidential information. Moreover, for geological surveys
as well as various consultancy services, different organizations
periodically collect statistics about a larger territory over
multiple vineyards, belonging to different producers, e.g., in
order to measure soil contamination. Such monitoring service
can also be beneficial for the producers as they may lack of
expertise to deeply analyze the quality of the soil. Importantly,
these organizations are only interested in aggregate measure-
ments over multiple vineyards, and less concerned with sensor
readings of a single producer. To this end, organizations can
use mobile base stations, which move along the perimeter of
Manuscript submitted on December 3, 2016.
Szilvia Lestyan is with CrySyS Lab, Dept. of Networked Systems
and Services, Budapest Univ. of Technology and Economics; email:
lestyan@crysys.hu
1http://smartvineyard.com
Fig. 1: Aggregation on vineyards. A mobile base station stops
at the perimeter of the area and builds an aggregation tree,
where the base station is the aggregator (root) node.
multiple vineyards without approaching the fields [2]. These
base stations initiate the aggregation protocol through the
sensor nodes they can reach via short-range communication.
That is, a base station builds an aggregation tree having the
base station as root and simply fan-in2 the values from leaves
to the root (see Figure 1).
However, producers do not trust each other or the organi-
zation providing the monitoring service. In particular, they do
not want neither another producer nor the organization to learn
any of their sensor readings. The above simple aggregation
protocol does not provide such privacy guarantees. In fact,
this protocol cannot guarantee privacy even in the presence of
semi-honest participants who follow the aggregation protocol
faithfully but may learn any private sensor reading from the
received messages. For example, a parent of a node in the ag-
gregation tree, where both nodes belong to different producers,
can immediately learn the measurement of its children, or an
eavesdropper can capture a sensor’s incoming and outgoing
aggregates and easily calculate the measurement of the sensor.
In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving aggregation
protocol for the above scenario. In particular, our protocol
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Abstract—We present a novel privacy-preserving data aggre-
gation protocol in wireless networks composed of short-range
devices. These devices provide a collaborative service and conduct
privacy-preserving computations to obtain the aggregated result
of their secret inputs. Our solution uses secure multi-party
primitives as well as a new distributed perturbation technique
to guarantee strong differential privacy against untrustworthy
aggregators.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although Internet is the prevalent communication network
today connecting billions of different devices worldwide, there
are still several practical cases where Internet connectivity is
scarce and expensive, such as surveillance and monitoring of
rural areas. In such applications, multi-hop wireless networks
using short-range communications still provide a cheaper and
compelling alternative to a global networking infrastructure.
For example, wireless sensor networks are deployed for the
purpose of monitoring agricultural areas in order to facilitate
more responsive intervention and to optimise maintenance
tasks with the aim to increase productivity [1]. However, differ-
ent producers can compete with each other, and hence security,
and in particular, confidentiality is of primary concern.
As a motivational scenario, consider vineyards1 where sen-
sors measure different regional characteristics such as the
pH of the soil or its mineral composition. Across a large
territory, there are several wineries, where winemakers use
different types of fertilisers for their field. The composition
of fertilisers is considered as trade secret among winemakers,
thus revealing some characteristics of the soil can also reveal
this confidential information. Moreover, for geological surveys
as well as various consultancy services, different organizations
periodically collect statistics about a larger territory over
multiple vineyards, belonging to different producers, e.g., in
order to measure soil contamination. Such monitoring service
can also be beneficial for the producers as they may lack of
expertise to deeply analyze the quality of the soil. Importantly,
these organizations are only interested in aggregate measure-
ments over multiple vineyards, and less concerned with sensor
readings of a single producer. To this end, organizations can
use mobile base stations, which move along the perimeter of
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Fig. 1: Aggregation on vineyards. A mobile base station stops
at the perimeter of the area and builds an aggregation tree,
where the base station is the aggregator (root) node.
multiple vineyards without approaching the fields [2]. These
base stations initiate the aggregation protocol through the
sensor nodes they can reach via short-range communication.
That is, a base station builds an aggregation tree having the
base station as root and simply fan-in2 the values from leaves
to the root (see Figure 1).
However, producers do not trust each other or the organi-
zation providing the monitoring service. In particular, they do
not want neither another producer nor the organization to learn
any of their sensor readings. The above simple aggregation
protocol does not provide such privacy guarantees. In fact,
this protocol cannot guarantee privacy even in the presence of
semi-honest participants who follow the aggregation protocol
faithfully but may learn any private sensor reading from the
received messages. For example, a parent of a node in the ag-
gregation tree, where both nodes belong to different producers,
can immediately learn the measurement of its children, or an
eavesdropper can capture a sensor’s incoming and outgoing
aggregates and easily calculate the measurement of the sensor.
In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving aggregation
protocol for the above scenario. In particular, our protocol
guarantees that (1) sensor nodes cannot learn each other’s read-
ings, (2) a passive eavesdropper cannot infer any measurement
2Fan-in is the algorithm where the values are sent from leaves to the root
and gradually aggregated at each inner node, therefore the total sum appears
at the root at the end of the algorithm.
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in the network, (3) the aggregator node, who is untrusted,
cannot learn any individual sensor reading in the network.
For this purpose, sensor nodes employ secure multiparty
computation as well as add noise to their readings in order
to provide strong differential privacy guarantees against the
aggregator. The variance of the noise is calibrated so that
the aggregator can still learn the aggregate but any of its
constituent measurement. We propose a novel distributed noise
generation algorithm based on the geometric divisibility of the
Laplace distribution, which provides increased robustness as
well as flexibility over state-of-the-art solutions.
Our contributions are summarised as follows.
• We propose a novel mechanism to compute the sum of
measurements (e.g. pH value of the soil, temperature,
etc.) of multiple nodes in a privacy preserving and dis-
tributed manner assuming semi-honest adversaries. Our
solution relies on secure multi-party primitives combined
with homomorphic encryption. In addition, we noise
the aggregate to prevent the untrusted aggregator from
learning individual sensor readings in the network and
hence providing formal privacy guarantees.
• We introduce a novel technique for privacy preserving
distributed noise generation. We use the geometric in-
finite divisibility property of the Laplace distribution to
preserve ε-differential privacy. This new noise generation
method provides increased robustness and flexibility on
distributed systems over earlier solutions.
II. RELATED WORK
Our view of privacy preserving and computational model
derived from a multi-party approach. For a survey of privacy
preserving data mining see e.g. [3] and [4], and on general
multi-party computation see [5] or [6] The basic idea of
Secure Multiparty Computation (SMPC) is that a computation
is secure if at the end of the computation, no party knows
anything except its own input and the results (privacy). Secure
two party computation was first investigated by Yao [7], and
was later generalised to multiparty computation [5], [8]. These
works all use a similar methodology: the function f to be
computed is first represented as a combinatorial circuit, and
then the parties run a short protocol for every gate in the circuit.
The aim of secure multiparty computation is to enable
parties to carry out such distributed computing tasks in a secure
manner. Whereas distributed computing [9] [10] classically
deals with questions of computing under the threat of ma-
chine crashes and other inadvertent faults, secure multiparty
computation is concerned with the possibility of deliberately
malicious behavior by some adversarial entity.
On the combination of SMPC and graph algorithms, see
a weighted case [11], where a protocol with which a set
of n stores, selling l products between them, participate in
joint computation to securely determine cjk, the number of
times product j and product k have sold together in all
stores combined (without revealing any information about the
products that any one store, individually, sells).
Others have only considered some route-planning in a
similar setting: for privacy-preserving computation of APSD
(all pairs shortest distance) and SSSD (single source shortest
distance) see [12]; and in [13] a private computation for
collision-avoiding route planning is introduced.
A comparative study has been fairly recently written on the
problem of secure data aggregation in a distributed setting
while preserving differential privacy for the aggregated data
[14]. In their paper, they show the infinite divisibility of the
Laplace distribution, and generate partial noises by drawing
random variables from the gamma, the Gauss and one Laplace
distributions.
In order to read on the application of the Laplace distribution
based on the gamma distribution see [15]; where a privacy-
preserving smart metering scheme that guarantees users’ pri-




Let P1, P2, ..., PN be parties (i.e., producer) owning private
measurements x1, x2, ..., xN ∈ R. The parties wish to apply
a function to the joint set
⋃
xi without revealing any unnec-
essary information about their individual values. That is, the
only information learned by Pi about x−i (where x−i is any
other measurement except xi) is that which can be learned
from the output of the algorithm, and vice-versa. We do not
assume any trusted third party who computes the joint output
on the raw data.
We also assume that a unique label is given to each party
(or nodes). We do not assume a peer-to-peer system to be
available, e.g. it is not necessary for all the parties to be directly
connected. A channel between two parties is bidirectional and
first in first out (FIFO), i.e. the messages received in the
order in which they have been sent. Each party is represented
by a single sensor node in the network. In case a producer
deploys multiple sensors over his vineyard in our motivational
scenario (see Section I), a single sensor is selected per vineyard
which collects all measurements over the vineyard and can
be reached by either the base station or by a sensor of a
neighboring vineyard. Therefore, the topology of the parties
can be represented with an arbitrary strongly connected graph.
We could also view the model as a multi-hop ad-hoc
network, where nodes cooperate to form a network without
using any infrastructure such as access points or base stations.
Instead, nodes forward packets to each other, allowing com-
munication among nodes outside wireless transmission range.
For a survey on attacks on multi-hop ad-hoc networks see [16].
The channels between any two parties can be secure or
insecure as well. A secure channel is a way of transferring
data that is resistant to overhearing and tampering. In case of
an insecure channel an eavesdropper can overhear any message
(ciphertext) from any existing channel and try to decipher it.
Each party Pi has a set of neighbors, denoted Ni, this
set contains the identities (labels) of these parties. This is
the only knowledge a node (participant) can have of the
global graph, e.g. it cannot "see" any other nodes besides its
direct neighbours, it does not even know the total number of
participants (only if it is the result of a particular protocol).
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This model is partially synchronous (timing-based), i.e. we
assume some restrictions on the relative timing of events,
but execution is not completely lock-step as it is in the syn-
chronous model. These models are the most realistic, but they
are also the most difficult to program. Algorithms designed
using knowledge of the timing of event can be efficient, but
they can also be fragile in that they will not run correctly if
the timing assumptions are violated.
B. Adversary Model
The adversary is assumed to be semi-honest and static,
malicious adversaries are also partly considered [17], [18].
Therefore, semi-honest parties faithfully follow the protocol
specification, yet attempt to learn additional information by
analyzing the messages received during the protocol execution.
Although the semi-honest adversarial model is weaker than the
malicious model (where a party may arbitrarily deviate from
the specification, it is often a realistic one. This is because
deviating from a specified protocol which may be buried in a
complex application is a non-trivial task. Moreover, producers
do not collude with the potentially malicious aggregator.
C. Privacy and Security Model
It is assumed that a protocol execution can be attacked by an
external entity, or even by a subset of the participating parties.
The aim of this attack may be to learn private measurement or
cause the result of the computation to be incorrect. In order to
avoid this, every node can send its output to the trusted party,
who performs the computation. But this is unlikely to happen
in our scenario, thus we use and design algorithms where the
same result can be achieved without using a trusted party.
Different definitions of security for multiparty computation
have been proposed, in this paper we are going to use the
following [18]:
• Privacy: No party should learn anything more than its
prescribed output. In particular, the only information that
should be learned about other parties’ inputs is what
can be derived from the output itself. For example, in
an auction where the only bid revealed is that of the
highest bidder, it is clearly possible to derive that all
other bids were lower than the winning bid. However,
this should be the only information revealed about the
losing bids.
• Correctness: Each party is guaranteed that the output
that it receives is correct.
• Independence of inputs: Corrupted parties must choose
their inputs independently of the honest parties’ inputs.
• Guaranteed output delivery: Corrupted parties should
not be able to prevent honest parties from receiving their
output. For example, the adversary should not be able
to disrupt the computation by carrying out a denial of
service attack.
• Fairness: Corrupted parties should receive their outputs
if and only if the honest parties also receive their outputs.
D. Differential Privacy
The above guarantees still allow the untrusted aggregator to
learn individual sensor readings from the aggregate. Indeed,
knowing a few measurements in the network (e.g., the aggre-
gator may deploy extra sensors in the observed area to replicate
the measurements) may help the aggregator to obtain a more
accurate approximation of the remaining measurements.
Differential privacy ensures that the removal or addition of a
single measurement from the network does not (substantially)
affect the outcome of any analysis performed on the set of all
measurements (such as the output of an aggregate function).
Roughly speaking, this means that even if the aggregator learns
all constituent measurements of the aggregate except one, it
will not be able to infer this unknown measurement if the
aggregate itself is differential private.
Suppose two databases D1 and D2, which differ in at most
one record (measurement), where one is a proper subset of
the other and the larger database contains just one additional
measurement [19].
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy). A randomised algorithm
A gives ε-differential privacy if for all data sets D1 and D2
differing on at most one record, and all S ⊂ Range(A),
Pr[A(D1) ∈ S] ≤ eε × Pr[A(D2) ∈ S]
The probability is taken is over the coin tosses of A.
The above definition guarantees that if one participant’s data
is removed from the dataset no outputs (and thus consequences
of outputs) would become significantly more or less likely (up
to ε). That is, all possible values of the aggregate are almost
equally likely with D1 and D2. If ε is small, we have stronger
privacy guarantee as the output probabilities become closer.
To provide differential privacy, the output of f (i.e., the
aggregate) needs to be randomised, for example, by adding
noise to that where the noise variance is calibrated to the
sensitivity of the aggregate.
Definition 2 (Global sensitivity). Global sensitivity Sf of f :
D → R is the maximum absolute valued difference between a




where D1 and D2 differ in a single entry.
It has been shown that by perturbing the output of a
function f , we are able to reach ε-differential privacy [19].
The perturbation shall be a random noise added to the value
of f , furthermore the distribution of the noise is dependent on
the global sensitivity of f .
Theorem 1 (Laplace Mechanism). For all f : D → R, the
following algorithm A is ε-differential private:
A(D) = f(D) + L(S(f)/ε)
where L(λ) is an independently generated random variable
following the Laplace distribution with probability density
function g(x) = 12λe
− |x|λ and S(f) denotes the global sen-
sitivity of f .
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not be able to prevent honest parties from receiving their
output. For example, the adversary should not be able
to disrupt the computation by carrying out a denial of
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learn individual sensor readings from the aggregate. Indeed,
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accurate approximation of the remaining measurements.
Differential privacy ensures that the removal or addition of a
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affect the outcome of any analysis performed on the set of all
measurements (such as the output of an aggregate function).
Roughly speaking, this means that even if the aggregator learns
all constituent measurements of the aggregate except one, it
will not be able to infer this unknown measurement if the
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Suppose two databases D1 and D2, which differ in at most
one record (measurement), where one is a proper subset of
the other and the larger database contains just one additional
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differing on at most one record, and all S ⊂ Range(A),
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to ε). That is, all possible values of the aggregate are almost
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function f , we are able to reach ε-differential privacy [19].
The perturbation shall be a random noise added to the value
of f , furthermore the distribution of the noise is dependent on
the global sensitivity of f .
Theorem 1 (Laplace Mechanism). For all f : D → R, the
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In our case, f represents the aggregate function which is
the sum of sensor measurements, and its sensitivity is the
maximum of any measurement that a sensor can take. If this
value is too large, then every measurement can be truncated to
a pre-defined threshold t by each sensor node, hence ensuring
that the global sensitivity is at most t in the whole network.
Therefore, to guarantee ε-differential privacy, we need to add
a random value to the aggregate which is sampled form a
Laplace distribution with zero mean and variance 2S(f)2/ε2.
Intuitively, if a single measurement can substantially change
the output of f , then larger noise needed to be introduced
to “hide” the contribution of a single record (sensor) to the
aggregate. However, larger noise also deteriorates utility as
the final aggregate will be inaccurate. This is a fundamental
trade-off between utility and privacy: larger/smaller noise
yields stronger/weaker privacy and smaller/larger utility. There
seems to be no free lunch. On the other hand, the relative
error of the aggregate (or “signal-to-noise ratio”) can also
be decreased without degrading privacy by aggregating more
sensor readings. This is because the aggregate (sum) becomes
larger while the added Laplace noise is still calibrated to the
global sensitivity which remains unchanged by adding more
readings to the aggregate.
IV. BUILDING BLOCKS
In this section, we introduce some basic building blocks that
are used in our solution.
A. Privacy Preserving Primitive: Secure Sum
In SMPC, each participant holds onto a number of their own,
and they would like to compute the sum of their inputs. The
aggregator – one of the parties – generates a random number
R, adds R to its local value and sends the result to the next
party. All participants add their local value to the received
number. Finally the aggregator receives the sum, subtracts R
from the result and broadcasts the result. This guarantees that
no one besides the aggregator will learn the correct sum of the
values.
B. Homomorphic Encryption
A homomorphism is a structure-preserving map between
two algebraic structures. Using homomorphic encryption, com-
putations can be carried out on ciphertext, thus generating an
encrypted result which, when decrypted, matches the result
of operations performed on the plaintext. We use the Paillier
cryptosystem [20] in this paper. In this scheme, if the public
key is the modulus m and the base g, then the encryption of
a message x is
Enc(x) = gxrm mod m2
for some random r ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}. The homomorphic
property is then
Enc(x1) · Enc(x2) = (gx1rm1 )(gx2rm2 ) mod m2
= gx1+x2(r1r2)
m mod m2
= Enc(x1 + x2)
C. Robust DFS
We build an aggregation tree using a distributed version
of the depth-first search (DFS) algorithm. We need to create
univoque routes between all nodes in order to avoid redundant
packet channelling and to support aggregation. We must note
that this problem is reminiscent of the secure routing problem
in wireless or distributed networks, which has been widely
studied in the literature [16]. Here, we only provide a basic
solution which fits our goal. In particular, a DFS tree results
in a definite order of the messages which property is indis-
pensable for our solution to obtain the correct aggregates. The
distributed version of the BFS algorithm can be found in [9]
[10], the Robust DFS algorithm described below is analogous
to the BFS one:
Building a Depth First Search Tree:
1) At any point during execution, there are some nodes that
are "marked", initially just i0, the root. The root sends a
search message at the first round to one of its neighbours.
2) At any round, if an unmarked node receives a search
message, it marks itself, sets and notifies its parent with
a child message, and sends non-child message to those
nodes from which it received a search message in earlier
rounds.
3) After this, the node sends the search message to one of
its neighbours.
4) This continues until a search message reaches a leaf
node. A leaf node realises that it is indeed a leaf-node
by receiving non-child messages from all of its children
candidates (or have only one neighbour).
5) When a node declares itself as a leaf it sends an end
message back to its parent who then chooses another
neighbour of its own and waits for the next end message.
When it received messages from all of its neighbours, the
node sends the end it to its parent.
6) The algorithm ends when the root could also send the
end message.
REMARK: In the non-secure version of the above protocol,
a node also sends the list of its parent and children to
neighboring nodes, therefore every other node in the graph
may be able to reconstruct the tree (or the whole graph) using
the received lists of parents and children.
Robustness: The network can lose some nodes due to power
failure, hardware or software complications and many more
that can cause the node to be detached from the network.
Moreover, nodes can potentially be mobile, such as in wireless
mobile ad-hoc or vehicular networks. To increase robustness
against these failures and potential node mobility, we extend
the above algorithm as follows. When a node detects that
one (or) some of its neighbours are disconnected, it does the
following:
1) if it is a child node, it does nothing;
2) if it is a parent, then
a) if there is another node during the tree-building phase
who was second to become its parent, i.e. sent the node
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a Search message, then the node notifies them about the
change and becomes its child;
b) if there is none like the above the node notifies one of
its children to search for a new parent and they switch
roles, i.e. the child becomes the parent and vice-versa;
c) if none of the above succeed, or the node has no other
neighbours, then it becomes an isolated node (or tree).
Security in the presence of semi-honest adversaries:
• Privacy: Complies. No node learns anything about the
global graph, they learn only their parent and children
nodes, i.e. the local output.
• Independence of inputs: Complies trivially.
• Output delivery: Complies trivially.
• Correctness: Complies trivially.
• Fairness: Complies trivially.
Security in the presence of malicious adversaries:
Consider the scenario when a node intentionally deviates from
the protocol. The only thing it can do without being detected
is to set several nodes as its parents, which violates the
property of correctness because the malicious node becomes
the child of some nodes of which it should not be thereby
corrupting their output. In particular, circles may be created
in the output graph, which is not a tree and hence an incorrect
output of the protocol.
Complexity: The time complexity is at most 2·diam rounds,
(where diam is the longest shortest path between any two
nodes ). The transmitted messages are composed of 3(e − 1)
search messages, where e denotes the number of edges, i.e.,
neighboring node pairs, one child or non-child message and
one end message between each neighboring pair of nodes.
Thus the time complexity is O(diam) and the communication
complexity is O(e).
D. Distributed Noise Generation
To achieve differential privacy, Theorem 1 suggests that
Laplace noise with scale λ = S(f)/ε needs to be added to the
value of the aggregate function f . A natural question arises:
Which node should add this noise to the aggregate? As the
aggregator is untrusted, the sensor nodes themselves need to
add the required amount of noise in a distributed manner.
A naive solution would be that a single node is selected to
inject all the Laplace noise. However, this approach requires
the cooperation of nodes which can be expensive. Also, this
makes the protocol less robust against privacy attacks as the
selected single node may be malfunctioning (i.e., do not add
the noise) or already left the network.
Instead, in our solution, each node probabilistically and
independently decides whether it adds some noise share to
this aggregate such that the sum of these added noise shares
yields the required amount Laplace noise needed to guarantee
differential privacy. For that, we rely on the following property
of the Laplace distribution [21]:
Definition 3 (Geometric Infinite Divisibility). A random vari-
able Y (and its probability distribution) is said to be geometric







where µp is a geometric random variable with mean 1/p,
and the random variables Y (i)p are independent and identically
distributed for each p, and µp and Y
(i)
p are independent.
The Laplace distribution exhibits the above geometric in-
finite divisibility, which is shown by the following theorem
[21].
Theorem 2. Let Y possess a Laplace distribution L(λ) with
zero mean. Then, Y is geometric infinitely divisible and for




Our solution combines the Secure Sum primitive (in Section
IV-A) with homomorphic encryption (in Section IV-B) and
distributed noise injection to preserve differential privacy (in
Section IV-D). A DFS tree is assumed to be already built
(as described in Section IV-C) before running our aggregation
protocol.
A. Basic protocol
The operation of the aggregator and sensor nodes are shown
in Algorithm 1 and 2, respectively.
Algorithm 1 Secure Aggregation: Aggregator node
1: Generate public-secret key pairs (pk1, sk1) and (pk2, sk2)
2: p := 1/N
3: G := 0
4: for all child j ∈ [1,m] do
5: Send {G, p, pk1, pk2} to a child j
6: Receive {Gj , cj1, cj2} from child j
7: G := ∨ji=1Gi
8: c1 :=
∏m










j=1 cj1 = Encpk2(
∑N
i=1 ri)
10: Decrypt (c1, c2) to retrieve the noisy aggregate R, where







i=1 Yj ∼ L(S/ε)
We assume that the aggregator (root) node knows the size
N of the network. First, the root generates two pairs of
homomorphic asymmetric keys (pk1, sk1) and (pk2, sk2), then
sets the noise parameter p (see Definition 2) to 1/N and sends
the public keys along with p to its children. The children
forward this message to their children and so forth, until the
message reaches the a leaf node.
When a leaf receives the message of the aggregator from
its parent, it tosses a biased coin which results in head with
probability p (denoted by G = 1 in Alg. 2). If the result of
the coin toss is 0, the node generates a Laplace noise with
scale S
√
p/ε, where S denotes the global sensitivity of the
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a Search message, then the node notifies them about the
change and becomes its child;
b) if there is none like the above the node notifies one of
its children to search for a new parent and they switch
roles, i.e. the child becomes the parent and vice-versa;
c) if none of the above succeed, or the node has no other
neighbours, then it becomes an isolated node (or tree).
Security in the presence of semi-honest adversaries:
• Privacy: Complies. No node learns anything about the
global graph, they learn only their parent and children
nodes, i.e. the local output.
• Independence of inputs: Complies trivially.
• Output delivery: Complies trivially.
• Correctness: Complies trivially.
• Fairness: Complies trivially.
Security in the presence of malicious adversaries:
Consider the scenario when a node intentionally deviates from
the protocol. The only thing it can do without being detected
is to set several nodes as its parents, which violates the
property of correctness because the malicious node becomes
the child of some nodes of which it should not be thereby
corrupting their output. In particular, circles may be created
in the output graph, which is not a tree and hence an incorrect
output of the protocol.
Complexity: The time complexity is at most 2·diam rounds,
(where diam is the longest shortest path between any two
nodes ). The transmitted messages are composed of 3(e − 1)
search messages, where e denotes the number of edges, i.e.,
neighboring node pairs, one child or non-child message and
one end message between each neighboring pair of nodes.
Thus the time complexity is O(diam) and the communication
complexity is O(e).
D. Distributed Noise Generation
To achieve differential privacy, Theorem 1 suggests that
Laplace noise with scale λ = S(f)/ε needs to be added to the
value of the aggregate function f . A natural question arises:
Which node should add this noise to the aggregate? As the
aggregator is untrusted, the sensor nodes themselves need to
add the required amount of noise in a distributed manner.
A naive solution would be that a single node is selected to
inject all the Laplace noise. However, this approach requires
the cooperation of nodes which can be expensive. Also, this
makes the protocol less robust against privacy attacks as the
selected single node may be malfunctioning (i.e., do not add
the noise) or already left the network.
Instead, in our solution, each node probabilistically and
independently decides whether it adds some noise share to
this aggregate such that the sum of these added noise shares
yields the required amount Laplace noise needed to guarantee
differential privacy. For that, we rely on the following property
of the Laplace distribution [21]:
Definition 3 (Geometric Infinite Divisibility). A random vari-
able Y (and its probability distribution) is said to be geometric







where µp is a geometric random variable with mean 1/p,
and the random variables Y (i)p are independent and identically
distributed for each p, and µp and Y
(i)
p are independent.
The Laplace distribution exhibits the above geometric in-
finite divisibility, which is shown by the following theorem
[21].
Theorem 2. Let Y possess a Laplace distribution L(λ) with
zero mean. Then, Y is geometric infinitely divisible and for




Our solution combines the Secure Sum primitive (in Section
IV-A) with homomorphic encryption (in Section IV-B) and
distributed noise injection to preserve differential privacy (in
Section IV-D). A DFS tree is assumed to be already built
(as described in Section IV-C) before running our aggregation
protocol.
A. Basic protocol
The operation of the aggregator and sensor nodes are shown
in Algorithm 1 and 2, respectively.
Algorithm 1 Secure Aggregation: Aggregator node
1: Generate public-secret key pairs (pk1, sk1) and (pk2, sk2)
2: p := 1/N
3: G := 0
4: for all child j ∈ [1,m] do
5: Send {G, p, pk1, pk2} to a child j
6: Receive {Gj , cj1, cj2} from child j
7: G := ∨ji=1Gi
8: c1 :=
∏m










j=1 cj1 = Encpk2(
∑N
i=1 ri)
10: Decrypt (c1, c2) to retrieve the noisy aggregate R, where







i=1 Yj ∼ L(S/ε)
We assume that the aggregator (root) node knows the size
N of the network. First, the root generates two pairs of
homomorphic asymmetric keys (pk1, sk1) and (pk2, sk2), then
sets the noise parameter p (see Definition 2) to 1/N and sends
the public keys along with p to its children. The children
forward this message to their children and so forth, until the
message reaches the a leaf node.
When a leaf receives the message of the aggregator from
its parent, it tosses a biased coin which results in head with
probability p (denoted by G = 1 in Alg. 2). If the result of
the coin toss is 0, the node generates a Laplace noise with
scale S
√
p/ε, where S denotes the global sensitivity of the
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Algorithm 2 Secure Aggregation: Non-aggregator (sensor)
node
1: Receive {G, p, pk1, pk2} from the parent
2: for all child j ∈ [1,m] do
3: Send {G, p, pk1, pk2} to a child j
4: Receive {Gj , cj1, cj2} from child j
5: G := ∨ji=1Gi
6: if G = 1 then
7: Y := 0
8: else
9: G ∼ B(p), where B is the Bernoulli distribution
10: if G = 0 then
11: Y ∼ L(S√p/ε)
12: else
13: Y := 0
14: Generate r uniformly at random
15: Send (G, c1, c2) to the parent, where
16: c1 := Encpk1(r + x+ Y ) ·
∏m
j=1 cj1
17: c2 := Encpk2(r) ·
∏m
j=1 cj2
sum (see Theorem 1), which is the maximum value of any
sensor measurement (or its truncation threshold). Afterwards,
the node generates a random number r, which is added to the
node measurement x and encrypted with key pk1 to get c1.
In addition, r is also encrypted with the other key pk2 to get
c2. The encrypted messages c1 and c2 along with the result
G of the coin toss are sent back to the parent as a reply. Any
intermediate node between a leaf and the aggregator repeats the
same steps as the leaf node after receiving all reply messages
from its children, except that it also checks if it receives G = 1
from any of its children, that is, any node in the corresponding
subtree observed head by executing the coin toss. If so, it
will not add Laplace noise to its own measurement before
encryption. As a result, the sensor nodes fan-in the values
along the edges of the built DFS tree. When the root receives
all reply messages from its children it aggregates them likewise
all other sensor nodes, then decrypts the received ciphertexts
with secret keys sk1 and sk2. After decryption, the aggregator
removes the random value
∑N
i=1 ri from the aggregate by
subtracting Decsk1(c1) from Decsk2(c2), thus obtaining the

























where xi and ri are the measurement and random value
generated by node i, respectively, and Yi is the noise share









and hence the aggregator obtains the noisy aggregate which
is ε-differential private due to Theorem 2 and 1. In particular,
each node repeats the coin tossing until the first node succeeds
to get 1 (head), which then notifies the rest of the nodes that
they do not need to generate more noise, hence Y = 0 for
all subsequent nodes. In other words, we have a geometrically
distributed number of random values drawn from the Laplace
distribution with scale L(S√p/ε), which means that
∑N
i=1 Yi
follows a Laplace distribution with L(S/ε) based on Theorem
2. Moreover, as p = 1/N , all nodes generate Laplace noise ex-
actly once with large probability. Nevertheless, p is a parameter
which can be set depending on node failures hence providing
increased robustness and flexibility over prior works.
Notice that, in the geometric distribution, we must have
infinite possibilities to succeed, which might not be the case
if each node tosses the coin exactly once (i.e., with some
positive, albeit small probability none of the nodes have
head after finishing the above protocol, which means that
the Laplace noise shares will not sum up to the required
Laplace noise needed for ε-differential privacy). To alleviate
this problem, we allow the nodes to make as many rounds
as needed for one successful coin toss in the DFS tree.
Therefore, we need to repeat the above protocol until at least
one head occurs at any node where each node adds Laplace
noise to the aggregate (without adding their measurement x
to the random r in Line 16 of Alg. 2).
Motivation of geometric divisibility: There have been
proposed several schemes for distributed noise generation to
guarantee differential privacy [14], all of them are based on the
divisibility of the Laplace distribution. The reason we chose
geometric divisibility for our model lies in its flexibility. In
particular, any network nodes may fail from time to time due
to various reasons; if we used any technique described in [14],
the failed nodes would not add noise to the sum which would
imply extra noise generation tasks from other nodes, or the
resetting of the parameters of the distribution. One workaround
for this problem could be to select a subset of all nodes for
the noise generation task, but this is difficult for distributed
systems. In our scheme, there is no need for such coordination;
upon the detection of the failure of a child node, the parent
can report its own measurement towards its parent without any
modification of the protocol. This is because G in Algorithm
2 is drawn independently at each sensor node. Moreover, the
probability p of this biased coin toss can also be flexibly
adjusted depending on the anticipated number of node failures
which also provides stronger robustness.
B. Extension to a malicious aggregator
In Algorithm 1, the aggregator can easily decrypt the partial
sums, corresponding to each of its children, before forwarding
that to other children, thus it can learn the partial sums of
the aggregate. To overcome this problem, the children of the
aggregator can add additional random value that cancel out
when their partial sums are summed. For example, if node Pi
adds +Ri,j , then another child Pj of the root node needs to add
−Ri,j to its partial sum3. This way the aggregator must add all
3A similar method is used in [15]
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the partial sums belonging to each of its children in order to get
the correct aggregate. This implies that a secure channel needs
to be established between any pair of children to agree on the
value of Ri,j . For example, the children of the aggregator can
derive a shared secret key K, using any key exchange protocol
such as Diffie-Hellman, which is known to all the children
of the aggregator except the aggregator4. Then, similarly to
[15], Ri,j can be computed as Ri,j = PRF (K,Pi, Pj) where
PRF (·) is a pseudo-random function.
If the aggregator is malicious, it can also misbehave by lying
to one of its child node that G = 1 (i.e., it falsely claims that
there has been a sensor node before whose coin toss resulted
in head). This causes less Laplace noise to be added in the
network than what is required to achieve ε-differential privacy.
We can however easily amend Algorithm 1 to resist against
such attack by using key K shared between all children of the
aggregator. In particular, the children of the aggregator can
compute a message authentication code (MAC) using K on
the value of G and attach this MAC to the message sent to
the aggregator. This MAC is required to be forwarded by the
aggregator to other children as part of the message in Line
5 of Algorithm 1, and hence, any child node can detect, by
verifying the MAC, if the aggregator modifies G.
C. Analysis
First, consider the requirements of security based on secure
multi-party computation described in our Privacy and Security
Model.
Security in the presence of semi-honest adversaries:
• Privacy: Complies. No node learns anything more than
its prescribed output. The root learns some additional
information - the partial sums of its children and the
partial sums of the random numbers-, but it cannot derive
the individual inputs.
• Independence of inputs: Complies. All inputs are en-
crypted, one node has to break the encryption in order
to learn anything.
• Output delivery: Complies trivially.
• Correctness: Complies trivially.
• Fairness: Complies trivially.
Security in the presence of malicious adversaries: The
privacy of the above SMPC still complies. If the root is the
adversary unfortunately even independence fails, since the root
can in any way alter the result depending on the received sum.
Moreover, with this kind of an adversary we cannot guarantee
any other requirement. Although, if an inner node is malicious
independence complies, but the rest are do not regarding the
subtree under the malicious node.
The reason for adding random numbers to the output in the
algorithm is the following. Assume that we expect the inputs
to be in a closed, short interval, taking discrete values. In such
a case anyone could try all values by applying brute-force
attack to get the information. The pairs of keys are used for the
4Notice that sensor nodes (i.e., producers) do not collude with the aggregator
(i.e., organization)
following reason. If we used no encryption, noise nor random
numbers we could face several attack scenarios. For example,
if the inputs were very diverse, then a partial sum at an inner
node would not carry any information about the underlying
sub-tree or the global graph for a node. However if the values
are similar one could easily approximate the size of a subtree
or even the whole graph. Finally, if an eavesdropper had access
to one node’s incoming and outgoing messages it could easily
calculate the node’s input, and also the partial sum sent to the
node.
The second key which encrypts the (sum of) random num-
bers is necessary because we can eliminate the first attack
mentioned above. The first key - which encrypts the sum of the
measurements, the noise and the random number(s) - is used
for preventing the eavesdropper’s attack, but if we used solely
this key, then an eavesdropper could still capture the incoming
and the outgoing messages of one node, encrypt the random
numbers with the broadcasted key, and by simple subtraction
learn that nodes measurement. Thus the need for two different
homomorphic encryption keys.
Differential privacy: According to Theorem 2 on the
geometric divisibility of the Laplace distribution with L(λ),
the algorithm generates µp values drawn from the Laplace
distribution with parameters L(λ√p), where µp is a random
variable having geometric distribution. The sum of these values
has distribution L(s). The aggregated result with the noise is










where Y has Laplace distribution L(λ).
We used a biased coin with probability p = 1/N , because
the geometric distribution is the probability distribution of
the number X of Bernoulli trials needed to get one success,
supported on the set 1, 2, 3, ...; therefore we get a geometric
random variable number of nodes. Therefore the nodes align in
a sequence of the DFS tree and keep on sequentially flipping
a biased coins independently from each other until they get
the first success. Furthermore, we want to set the probability
of success of the geometric distribution to 1/N , where N is
the number of nodes in the graph. Thus the expected value
of a random variable with geometric distribution is 1/p = N ,
hence with high probability we are going to have all the nodes
in the graph adding noise to their output exactly once. Since
the geometric distribution has infinite support we cannot limit
the number of trials to N . Therefore if all nodes have already
tossed a coin but none succeeded, then we must restart the
experiment from the first node until we succeed, thus we gain
the infinite support of trials.
In summary, since Theorem 2 is fulfilled by the algorithm
it follows that differential privacy is preserved.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented a new method for preserving
ε-differential privacy in a distributed sensor system. We have
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the partial sums belonging to each of its children in order to get
the correct aggregate. This implies that a secure channel needs
to be established between any pair of children to agree on the
value of Ri,j . For example, the children of the aggregator can
derive a shared secret key K, using any key exchange protocol
such as Diffie-Hellman, which is known to all the children
of the aggregator except the aggregator4. Then, similarly to
[15], Ri,j can be computed as Ri,j = PRF (K,Pi, Pj) where
PRF (·) is a pseudo-random function.
If the aggregator is malicious, it can also misbehave by lying
to one of its child node that G = 1 (i.e., it falsely claims that
there has been a sensor node before whose coin toss resulted
in head). This causes less Laplace noise to be added in the
network than what is required to achieve ε-differential privacy.
We can however easily amend Algorithm 1 to resist against
such attack by using key K shared between all children of the
aggregator. In particular, the children of the aggregator can
compute a message authentication code (MAC) using K on
the value of G and attach this MAC to the message sent to
the aggregator. This MAC is required to be forwarded by the
aggregator to other children as part of the message in Line
5 of Algorithm 1, and hence, any child node can detect, by
verifying the MAC, if the aggregator modifies G.
C. Analysis
First, consider the requirements of security based on secure
multi-party computation described in our Privacy and Security
Model.
Security in the presence of semi-honest adversaries:
• Privacy: Complies. No node learns anything more than
its prescribed output. The root learns some additional
information - the partial sums of its children and the
partial sums of the random numbers-, but it cannot derive
the individual inputs.
• Independence of inputs: Complies. All inputs are en-
crypted, one node has to break the encryption in order
to learn anything.
• Output delivery: Complies trivially.
• Correctness: Complies trivially.
• Fairness: Complies trivially.
Security in the presence of malicious adversaries: The
privacy of the above SMPC still complies. If the root is the
adversary unfortunately even independence fails, since the root
can in any way alter the result depending on the received sum.
Moreover, with this kind of an adversary we cannot guarantee
any other requirement. Although, if an inner node is malicious
independence complies, but the rest are do not regarding the
subtree under the malicious node.
The reason for adding random numbers to the output in the
algorithm is the following. Assume that we expect the inputs
to be in a closed, short interval, taking discrete values. In such
a case anyone could try all values by applying brute-force
attack to get the information. The pairs of keys are used for the
4Notice that sensor nodes (i.e., producers) do not collude with the aggregator
(i.e., organization)
following reason. If we used no encryption, noise nor random
numbers we could face several attack scenarios. For example,
if the inputs were very diverse, then a partial sum at an inner
node would not carry any information about the underlying
sub-tree or the global graph for a node. However if the values
are similar one could easily approximate the size of a subtree
or even the whole graph. Finally, if an eavesdropper had access
to one node’s incoming and outgoing messages it could easily
calculate the node’s input, and also the partial sum sent to the
node.
The second key which encrypts the (sum of) random num-
bers is necessary because we can eliminate the first attack
mentioned above. The first key - which encrypts the sum of the
measurements, the noise and the random number(s) - is used
for preventing the eavesdropper’s attack, but if we used solely
this key, then an eavesdropper could still capture the incoming
and the outgoing messages of one node, encrypt the random
numbers with the broadcasted key, and by simple subtraction
learn that nodes measurement. Thus the need for two different
homomorphic encryption keys.
Differential privacy: According to Theorem 2 on the
geometric divisibility of the Laplace distribution with L(λ),
the algorithm generates µp values drawn from the Laplace
distribution with parameters L(λ√p), where µp is a random
variable having geometric distribution. The sum of these values
has distribution L(s). The aggregated result with the noise is










where Y has Laplace distribution L(λ).
We used a biased coin with probability p = 1/N , because
the geometric distribution is the probability distribution of
the number X of Bernoulli trials needed to get one success,
supported on the set 1, 2, 3, ...; therefore we get a geometric
random variable number of nodes. Therefore the nodes align in
a sequence of the DFS tree and keep on sequentially flipping
a biased coins independently from each other until they get
the first success. Furthermore, we want to set the probability
of success of the geometric distribution to 1/N , where N is
the number of nodes in the graph. Thus the expected value
of a random variable with geometric distribution is 1/p = N ,
hence with high probability we are going to have all the nodes
in the graph adding noise to their output exactly once. Since
the geometric distribution has infinite support we cannot limit
the number of trials to N . Therefore if all nodes have already
tossed a coin but none succeeded, then we must restart the
experiment from the first node until we succeed, thus we gain
the infinite support of trials.
In summary, since Theorem 2 is fulfilled by the algorithm
it follows that differential privacy is preserved.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented a new method for preserving
ε-differential privacy in a distributed sensor system. We have
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presented our model as a strongly connected graph having pro-
cessing units at the nodes. These participants want to engage in
a privacy preserving computation to gain the aggregated result
of their measurements. We have applied secure multiparty
computation protocols as basic building blocks to preserve
security; moreover, we have introduced a new distributed noise
generation protocol, where we used the geometric infinite
divisibility of the Laplace distribution. This distribution has a
property, namely the geometrically distributed number of noise
segments, that we utilised to make our protocol more robust
against node failures, and flexible in the expected value of the
number of nodes participating in the noise generation.
Building an even more secure version of an algorithm as
always is a challenge. Here the next step could be to create
secure versions under the assumption of malicious nodes.
Considering pseudo-random generators and synchronization in
order to test a node’s honesty is a possible approach.
Future work: This paper has focused on the feasibility of
privacy preserving data aggregation over Multi-hop networks.
Performance evaluation of the proposed algorithms in both
wireless and wired multi-hop networks, incorporating energy
efficiency and computational constraints, constitutes important
future work.
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Abstract— Manuscript deals with introduction of model for 
automatic selection of the scene with the best position of the 
object of interest in a multi-camera live broadcasts. The novel 
metric for evaluation of object appearance in multi-camera 
scenes was proposed and designed following the deep analysis of 
relevant broadcasting technologies and object tracking methods. 
Evaluation of object appearance in scene comprises not only 
from the location and size of the object of interest in the actual 
frame but also from streaming transmission parameters and the 
subjective rating from the broadcast recipients. The proposed 
metrics serve as the basis for the establishment of a system for 
selecting the best scene with switching in the real-time. Model has 
been experimentally deployed in two alternative implementations 
using common and mobile devices. Results were compared with 
human based broadcast direction. Based on this comparison, the 
ability to respond to changes in the scene and also to capture the 
object of interest in the stream was observed. The resulting 
application of model should be adapted in different fields such as 
broadcast of conferences, sport events or security systems. 
Keywords— Broadcast, Multi-camera, Scene selection, Object 
tracking 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years there has been a tremendous expansion of 
video technologies in terms of internet traffic. The amount of 
this traffic has grown exponentially and led to the formation of 
a new technologies dealing with the video processing, 
distribution and even recognition.  Research presented in this 
paper is addressing the interconnection of the outputs from the 
late developments in streaming and computer vision to the 
area of multi-camera systems with automatic director. 
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Tracking the object of interest in a scene from multiple 
cameras has become principal focus of the many researches, 
especially those dealing with security systems. Multi-camera 
broadcasts, however, exist also in other areas of life. Tracking 
of an object in video with subsequent shot evaluation is 
generally not the focal point of researches. Due to this reason, 
the ambition of this paper is to introduce a solution, which is 
to replace the manual switching of the output image in 
multi-camera streaming, i.e. provide the new approach to 
personalized broadcast, where each viewer receives a directed 
broadcast in real-time based on prior preferences and defined 
object of interest in the scene. Goal is to create an automatized 
model for streaming of exactly one video source, based on 
periodic evaluation of multiple video sources. Such source is 
to have the highest evaluation at given moment following the 
proposed metric. Idea of metric used for evaluation lies in 
rating of video sources based on actual position, size and other 
selected parameters of shot. Prior to design and 
implementation, the analysis of current streaming technologies 
is carried out as a theoretical basis for proposal of streaming 
management mechanisms and also another analysis of current 
detection of tracking algorithms resulting in a proposal of 
mechanism enabling evaluation of sources. 
II. MULTI-CAMERA STREAM AND OBJECT TRACKING 
A. Multi-cameras Systems 
Views from individual cameras utilised in multi-camera 
system may overlap and continuously cover specific part of 
space or can be isolated without any overlapping, providing 
there is a greater distance between cameras. 
Multi-camera system with overlapping views may be 
utilized to estimate the height of the tracked object in 3D 
space [1] or in creation of a global map of covered area, while 
providing the location of tracked objects on a map. In case of 
this configuration, the object is often detected concurrently by 
several cameras. For that reason, utilization of methods for 
definition of common areas in image and common points of 
interest is appropriate [2]. Field of view (FOV) lines are 
constructed based on fields of view [3], these lines are 
common for several views. Tracking of objects in case of 
multi-camera system with non-overlapping views from 
cameras is troublesome mainly due to separation in space and 
time during tracking of the object. In this case, the distance in 
time and space cannot be used as relevant information 
between particular nodes of system, unlike tracking 
approaches that utilize one camera. Example of utilization of 
methods for object tracking in multi-camera systems is 
selection of tracked person across the viewing areas, case of 
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security systems [4]. Another field of utilization is 
highlighting the position of objects, e.g. players, ball, puck or 
other gear utilized at sports events. 
Multi-camera surveillance systems commonly indicate the 
tracked object in a form of highlighted geometrical primitives 
surrounding the object across the outputs from all cameras or 
mark the position of object in global view on the map of 
monitored space. Due to this, the viewer has to monitor the 
output from all cameras and seek the highlighted square, circle 
or points of tracked object, i.e. coordinates and position in 
global map. Object in global map represents particular point, 
not the entire video. Useful solution is hence to stream the 
content from individual cameras of system, while utilizing 
streaming technologies and show only the view from one 
camera. One that detects the tracked object in scene and 
provides its best location. 
B. Streaming Technology 
Streaming technologies ensure the transfer of multimedia 
content over the computer network, in both audio and video 
along additional content, from the provider to the recipient [5].  
Many advantages emerge when we compare streaming 
multimedia formats to standard ones [6], the most significant 
are the following: possibility to control the bit rate of content, 
content protection against unauthorized use, possibility to 
select or filter the recipients of content and easy content 
management. Bearing in mind just stated and particularly due 
to the availability, these technologies are widely utilized in 
education systems, i.e. e-learning, and also in 
videoconferencing solutions [7]. Not only receiving of content 
but also broadcast directly from mobile devices is possible 
thanks to advanced development in the area of mobile devices 
[8]. 
Currently prevails a certain form of inconsistencies when it 
comes to usage of codecs and streaming formats in different 
browsers. H.264/AVC is an advanced codec developed by 
groups ITU-T VCEG and ISO/IEC MPEG. Codec consists of 
two layers: video coding layer (VCL) and network abstraction 
layer (NAL) [9]. VCL represents the video content itself and 
NAL is handling the structure of data, it is also carrier of 
information necessary for transfer. Such data is used by 
transport layer and storage media. [10]. 
Inherent component of streaming technologies are 
streaming protocols that ensure the transfer of packets with 
multimedia content. Streaming video server provides 
distribution of multimedia content into multiple packets and 
also initializes transfer to the end customer. Variant of client-
server model is a content delivery network (CDN) model. 
Main streaming server, in the solutions based on CDN, 
initially sends multimedia content to a group of content 
delivery servers that are strategically deployed at the edge of a 
network. Another emerging model of service delivery related 
to streaming is distribution over P2P networks [11]. 
C. Objeckt Tracking in Stream 
Following section is related to tracking itself or tracing the 
object in the sequence of images, i.e. in the video, considering 
one camera system. Analysis carried out for one camera 
system is to be beneficial in the process of proposing the 
evaluation metrics of multi-camera system. Resulting from 
this is the real model proposed in this paper. 
Image detection methods use image segmentation, this 
technique divides the image into the area referred to as the 
foreground, where the tracked object is to be found. Second 
part is called background, this part is not relevant for further 
processing. The resulting foreground is consisted of so called 
image elements and based on predefined pattern the relevant 
element is detected. Foreground may be extracted based on 
certain parameters such as colour, shape or texture. 
In terms of tracking the object in the video it is important 
to carry out object detection on the selected series of frames, 
separated by time, of the particular video. The location with 
respect to the captured view is calculated for each processed 
frame that contains the detected object. Series of location data 
subsequently define the nature of the object's movement, 
either in the form of a sequence of points with coordinates or 
in the form of a function. 
Detection of moving objects in the video can be 
accomplished through the filtering out the background. 
Filtering of the background based on the chromaticity or 
gradient may be implemented on the level of the pixel, region 
or the entire image. Methods for tracking of deviations in the 
individual video frames face various issues that occur during 
capturing of a real environment, these are: gradual or sudden 
changes in lighting, low level of colour uniqueness of tracked 
object from the background, unwanted shadow of the object, 
change in the background of the object being tracked or the 
constant movement of the object when detection initializes. 
All just stated factors affect the recognition success rate. 
Hence it is only appropriate to use so-called learning 
algorithms to continuously monitor changes in the tracked 
object and also complement the model pattern used for object 
detection. 
Common tracking system consists of three components: 
object representation, dynamic model and search mechanism. 
Object itself may be represented by either a holistic descriptor 
such as colour histogram and related brightness value of a 
pixel, or by local descriptor such as local histogram and 
chromaticity. Dynamic model is used to simplify the 
computational complexity in tracking of the object. Search 
mechanism is used to optimize the tracking of the real object 
and can utilize both deterministic and stochastic methods. 
Essential component in tracking methods is a motion model 
that can express, for example, translational movement, 
transformation based on similarities and the affinity 
transformation [12]. 
The existing methods used in object tracking in real-time 
include: incremental visual tracking (IVT) [13], variance ratio 
tracker (VRT) [14], fragments-based tracker (FragT) [15], 
online boosting tracker (BoostT) [16], semi-supervised tracker 
(SemiT) [17], extended semi-supervised tracker (BeSemiT) 
[18], Tracker (L1T) [19], multiple instance learning tracker 
(MIL) [20], visual tracking decomposition algorithm (VTD) 
[21] and track-learning-detection method (TLD). Reliability 
and functionality of these algorithms can be verified, for 
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example, by measuring the success while keeping up the 
detection of the monitored object and by shift of central 
position detection. In this paper two algorithms were selected, 
reporting the best results for use in the proposed system: TDL 
and CMT algorithms. 
TLD (Tracking-Learning-Detection) algorithm was 
developed for tracking and detection of objects in a video in a 
real-time. The object of interest is defined following the 
initialization of the square in one frame, such frame serves as 
a template. TLD simultaneously tracks the object, determines 
its features from the following frames and detects and verifies 
the occurrence of an object in the image. The result itself is 
tracking of the object in real-time. Accuracy and reliability is 
constantly improving as the duration of the tracking is getting 
longer, cause of this is learning of new features of tracked 
object, e.g. change of position, size, rotation, or luminosity 
[22]. 
Tracking algorithm used in the TLD is based on phase of 
recursive tracking in forward and reverse direction (Fig. 1), 
Canada-Lucas algorithm is executed in both directions and 
median is calculated as a final step. Detection in the TLD uses 
sparse filtering, file classifier and the nearest neighbour 
classifiers. TLD learning is performed in the form of P-N 
learning, extracted data is classified, while obtaining the its 
structure in the form of object path, positive (P) constraints are 
applied, with subsequent implementation of negative (N) 
constraints, then new data is generated and updated in the 
object classifier. P-type image segments represent objects with 
a high probability of correlation, when compared with the 
template, and vice versa, image segments of N-type represent 
objects with low probability of correlation [23]. 
 
Fig. 1. Experimental testing of Tracking-Learning-Detection algorithm for 
tracking the microphone in the video stream. 
CMT algorithm - Consensus-based matching and tracking 
is based on the keypoints method in combination with a 
matching-and-tracking framework (Fig. 2). CMT algorithm 
and his pythom implementation (pyCMT) expects input to be 
a sequence of frames and initialization region as pattern for 
detection in the very first frame. The goal of this algorithm is 
to renew the position of the pattern in each following frame 
and thus obtain the position of the tracked object. The output 
is the information of tracked object's position. Operation of 
CMT algorithm includes three essential steps: comparison of 
the correlation and keypoints tracking, voting and approval. 
To localize the object in each frame, the voting on position of 
central point from each keypoint is acquired. In order to detect 
the other points, the system based on approval of correlation in 
the voting is used.  Changes in size, location and rotation of 
detection region are visible as the transformation of votes 
follows the specific position of keypoints. Utilization of the 
fast keypoint detectors and binary descriptors introduces 
suitable domain for the application of the algorithm in terms 
of video processing in a real-time [24]. 
 
Fig. 2. Experimantal realization of tracking the head, microphone and hand 
based on CMT algorithm. 
III. DESIGN OF MODEL FOR OPTIMAL SHOT SELECTION 
The principal goal is to propose a metric that is to combine 
rating based on parameters with regard to the presence of the 
object in the shot as gained by the tracking algorithm, having 
the parameters of picture and voice. As a result, each node of 
multi-camera system is to be evaluated every second, based on 
this in each second the source of video stream is estimated and 
provides the best view and quality on the object of interest. 
Subsequently such shot becomes the primary and the only 
broadcasted view. 
A. Metric for evaluation of video sequence 
The principal metric in the proposed model will evaluate 
video sequence of each video source connected to the 
multi-camera system. Based on this metric the system will be 
able to determine which shot is best designed to visually track 
the object of interest in real-time. The metric (𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ) for 
evaluation of video sequence has been designed as the sum of 
the five components of the metrics, which are multiplied by a 
constants defined in the input vector (Equation 1). 
𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 = ( 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 𝑡𝑡 ) × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐ℎ × 𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡            (1) 
 
 Depending on the type of broadcast in which the proposed 
model is to be deployed, the utilization of c constants allows 
adjustment of weights of individual metric components, or 
exclusion of selected components from the evaluation. 
 Positional component of metrics (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ), used for the 
evaluation of video sequence, is based on data as extracted 
from tracking algorithm deployed in every stream of multi-
camera broadcasts. A significant effect on metrics component 
are the x and y coordinates, representing the occurrence of the 
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TLD (Tracking-Learning-Detection) algorithm was 
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a high probability of correlation, when compared with the 
template, and vice versa, image segments of N-type represent 
objects with low probability of correlation [23]. 
 
Fig. 1. Experimental testing of Tracking-Learning-Detection algorithm for 
tracking the microphone in the video stream. 
CMT algorithm - Consensus-based matching and tracking 
is based on the keypoints method in combination with a 
matching-and-tracking framework (Fig. 2). CMT algorithm 
and his pythom implementation (pyCMT) expects input to be 
a sequence of frames and initialization region as pattern for 
detection in the very first frame. The goal of this algorithm is 
to renew the position of the pattern in each following frame 
and thus obtain the position of the tracked object. The output 
is the information of tracked object's position. Operation of 
CMT algorithm includes three essential steps: comparison of 
the correlation and keypoints tracking, voting and approval. 
To localize the object in each frame, the voting on position of 
central point from each keypoint is acquired. In order to detect 
the other points, the system based on approval of correlation in 
the voting is used.  Changes in size, location and rotation of 
detection region are visible as the transformation of votes 
follows the specific position of keypoints. Utilization of the 
fast keypoint detectors and binary descriptors introduces 
suitable domain for the application of the algorithm in terms 
of video processing in a real-time [24]. 
 
Fig. 2. Experimantal realization of tracking the head, microphone and hand 
based on CMT algorithm. 
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The principal goal is to propose a metric that is to combine 
rating based on parameters with regard to the presence of the 
object in the shot as gained by the tracking algorithm, having 
the parameters of picture and voice. As a result, each node of 
multi-camera system is to be evaluated every second, based on 
this in each second the source of video stream is estimated and 
provides the best view and quality on the object of interest. 
Subsequently such shot becomes the primary and the only 
broadcasted view. 
A. Metric for evaluation of video sequence 
The principal metric in the proposed model will evaluate 
video sequence of each video source connected to the 
multi-camera system. Based on this metric the system will be 
able to determine which shot is best designed to visually track 
the object of interest in real-time. The metric (𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ) for 
evaluation of video sequence has been designed as the sum of 
the five components of the metrics, which are multiplied by a 
constants defined in the input vector (Equation 1). 
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 Depending on the type of broadcast in which the proposed 
model is to be deployed, the utilization of c constants allows 
adjustment of weights of individual metric components, or 
exclusion of selected components from the evaluation. 
 Positional component of metrics (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ), used for the 
evaluation of video sequence, is based on data as extracted 
from tracking algorithm deployed in every stream of multi-
camera broadcasts. A significant effect on metrics component 
are the x and y coordinates, representing the occurrence of the 
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object's central point contained within the input vector for a 
particular source of the stream. The positional component 
itself has been designed to act as the optimal composition of 
the golden ratio, i.e. the centre of the tracked object of interest 
should be located as close as possible to the nearest golden 
section of the shot (Fig. 3).  
 In this case, it is also possible to seek a composition where 
the object of interest is approaching the best location with 
respect to the termination of Fibonacci spiral in the four 
different shots. In this case, zones are designed to keep the 
most highly rated areas closests to the intersections of the 
golden rations of shot (see Equations 2). 
 
Fig. 3. Zonal division of scene based on golden ratio with positional 
component of metric calculation. 
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 𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝒏𝒏𝒕𝒕 = 𝟑𝟑 ⇔ 𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒                                                                      (2) 
 Dimensional component (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 𝑡𝑡 ) (Equation 3) of the 
proposed metrics is based on the parameters as derived by 
tracking algorithm for estimation of the actual height h and 
width w of tracked object in the shot with dimensions W and 
H. In this situation, the evaluation of this component is to be 
increased with increasing size of the reference object. 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 𝑡𝑡 = √
𝑤𝑤2 + ℎ2
𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠2 + 𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠2
                                                 (3) 
 Component concerning the reliability (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ) (Equation 4) 
of the object detection is directly dependent on the input data. 
This data represents reliability of detection d of tracking 
algorithm at time t contained within the input vector. 
Consequently, the component is to be in the form of 
percentage correlation, indicating the match of detected object 
in the image at time t to the pattern used for tracking. 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 = 𝑀𝑀                                                           (4) 
 The proposed metric also includes a component enabling 
the control of the resulting metric through the subjective 
evaluation (𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ) by the recipients of stream from multi-
camera broadcasts. In case of specific broadcast, each 
recipient would be able to evaluate each stream source at time 
t by a percentage value, i.e. change own evaluation 
dynamically throughout the broadcast. In order to guarantee 
the relevant processing of the evaluation of individual stream 
sources it is essential to introduce the calculation of evaluation 
based on Bayesian estimation – bearing in mind the stream is 
dependent on the number of recipients who are able to 
evaluate it, not only on the average evaluation (Equation 5). 
𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 =
(∑ 𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘=𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘=1 ) + (𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 × 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)
𝑗𝑗 + 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛
                                  (5) 
 Following the analysis of evaluation methods of video 
quality, the calculation of objective video quality component 
of metric (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ) (Equation 6) dependent on three fundamental 
parameters of picture was designed. These image parameters 
are the following: resolution of video stream (width W and 
height H), the actual transmission bandwidth 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 (bit-rate) and 
frame rate 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 compared to optimal bandwidth 𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 and optimal 
frame rate 𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜. 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 =
√𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜2 − (𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡)
2
2 × (√𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠2 + 𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠2) × 10−3
∗ 
√𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜2 − (𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡)
2
𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
                (6) 
 
B. Processing the results of evaluation 
 Processing requires individual results of partial evaluation 
metrics of image to be stored in the matrix (Equation 7) 
containing other sub-metrics for all sources of stream n at time 
t: 
𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = (











𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛 𝑡𝑡 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡
)                   (7) 
  
 Subsequently, the results of overall metrics 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 for each 
source at time t assemble the image metrics vector (Equation 
8) of results for the entire multi-camera system in time t: 
𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 = (𝑀𝑀1𝑡𝑡 𝑀𝑀2𝑡𝑡 … 𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 )                                         (8) 
 The final step is to select the stream source in real-time 
following the calculations of chosen metrics. Such source 
provides, in the specific broadcast the highest result of the 
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overall evaluation. Basis of selection is to calculate the 
maximum (Equation 9) of vector R, i.e. maxima of resulting 




𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡                                                     (9) 
  Each image capturing device generates a certain latency 
until the image gets to the output. In the terms of multi-camera 
heterogeneous system, e.g. consisted from standard SDI 
cameras, mobile phone with enabled 3G transfer, sports 
camera with Wi-Fi connectivity or IP camera via fixed line, 
the delay between video input and the output has to be on the 
same level. The ambition is to ensure that the object of interest 
in the image at time t is present in the same global position for 
all the input video sources during processing. This can be done 
indirectly by processing the audio track of stream, where the 
part of audio track from reference source with the lowest 
latency is selected at regular intervals and compared with 
other sources. The system would therefore be able re-evaluate 
how many ms is the shift from detected audio sequence of 
specific source (Fig. 4).  
 
Fig. 4. Synchornization of delay via audio track of multiple streams 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF MODEL 
Building a system following the proposed model is 
possible on multiple levels according to the character of use. 
Implementation diagram of the system, based on the model 
using the external video sources, is depicted in Fig. 5. Note 
that distribution mechanism is employed prior to the 
evaluation. 
Individual sources of live broadcasts from different angles 
are transmitted through the streaming distribution device, i.e. 
streaming server. The transferred stream of each video source, 
acquired from the distribution mechanism, is received and 
then processed by the tracking algorithm. Input is in the form 
of single instance per each video source. Results of tracing are 
sent, in a real-time, by each instance of object tracking 
mechanism. Evaluation is performed by the calculation 
mechanism, which receives the initial parameters of metrics as 
the input, these are: constants for subjective assessment, 
vector containing the constants of compression ratio and 
optimal frame rate, and vector encompassing the constants of 
the individual components of the global metrics. At the same 
time, the vector comprising of scene parameters and stream 
quality is provided to the calculation mechanism. Such vector 
is based on the encoding used in distribution mechanism or 
input encoder of video source. Evaluation mechanism of 
recipient associated with the content playback mechanism 
collects the ratings from recipients and provides them as the 
input to the calculation mechanism. Calculation mechanism 
continuously collects the input parameters. Output of this 
mechanism, a vector of ratings from all the input sources, is 
sent directly to the control mechanism. The control 
mechanism determines the best rating and source to be set as 
the output of the current broadcast, both is done in real-time. 
Control itself is thus connected directly to the content 
playback mechanism, where the distribution mechanism 
provides only the stream with the best rating to the recipient. 
 
Fig. 5. Implementation scheme with stream distribution mechanism 
Several system implementations were carried out as a part 
of this project, all were following the proposed model for the 
automatic selection of the optimal shot while utilizing specific 
streaming and computer vision technologies. One of such 
system configuration was the implementation encompassing 
the mobile devices with build-in camera, experimentally 
linked to the evaluation mechanisms located behind the 
streaming server (Fig. 6). 
In this configuration, two Android mobile devices, one 
iOS mobile device and sports GoPro camera were used as the 
sources of the image. Image extracted from Android devices 
was received directly by WSE streaming server, in this case by 
means of created RTMP encoder. iOS devices utilized Wowza 
GoCoder and stream from GoPro camera was distributed via 
FFmpeg to WSE server. As a result, all the image sources 
were distributed through streaming server. Subsequently, each 
distributed RTMP stream was processed by FFmpeg in 
separate instances of pyCMT tracking algorithm. Individual 
pyCMT instances passed on results of the position and size of 
the tracked object for further calculation of the final metrics, 
along with the WSE server stream and calculation of 
recipients rating parameters. The final metrics values were 
send, containing the information of maxima and identifier of 
best evaluated via vmix API. Then the output stream was 
passed to the output in the virtual mix, which received each 
stream separately from WSE server. Subsequently, the output 
stream encoded the required format through FMLE and 
forwarded it to a recipient's FlowPlayer player and to a control 
output. 
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Fig. 6. System configuration with using pyCMT mechanism 
Several experiments were carried out in the simulation 
environment. The moving object of interest was captured 
simultaneously using multiple cameras, both in different 
environments and different image dynamics. Then, the 
feedback, whether the object of interest in sequence t is 
visible, was retrieved from the recipients. Subjective 
evaluation of each sequence was done to provide the 
evaluation of the composition quality of the tracked object and 
also its distinctiveness when compared to the expectations of 
the viewer. Comparison included the manual director as is 
present in the standard system of video mix, this provided the 
information about the video stream selected as the output in 
time t. In case of same real-time video sequence, the table for 
comparison was continuously filled with the results as 
gathered from both, the automatic director based on the 
proposed model and manual director in standard video mix. 
Results included in the table create a map of the object 
visibility in the video sequence from both perspectives - 
comparison of the selection of output image and evaluation of 
composition. This allows us to express the correlation of 
automatic director to manual director, i.e. when it runs faster 
or, vice versa, when the lag is present. 
Proposed model was experimentally tested on extensive 
sequences of live broadcasts throughout each development and 
optimization phase of relevant metrics. Experimental 
multi-camera broadcast was selected as a sample of the model 
variability. This included combination of standard cameras 
and mobile devices build-in cameras. Pattern for the 
initialization box used for tracking of the object was set to 
copy the figure of a lecturer in front of blackboard (Fig. 7). 
 
Fig. 7. Experiment of tracking the lecturer in 4-camera stream 
 Simultaneously, the video streams assigned to a streaming 
mix were processed and combination of parameters from the 
evaluation mechanism and another combination of qualitative 
parameters allowed final evaluation metrics to provide the 
information of current source. Such source was set, at time t, 
as the output by streaming mix (Fig. 8). 
 
Fig. 8. Experiment of choosing the best rated stream based on tracking 
 The results of the final evaluation of individual sources for 
the selected broadcast sequence is depicted on the graph, see 
fig 9. 
 
Fig. 9. Results of 4-camera stream evaluation by proposed automatic system 
 Comparison of the results served for the evaluation of 
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both automatized system using proposed model (blue) and 
manual director (red) were deployed (see Fig. 10).  
 This experiment shows that automatic selection of the best 
view does not match the manual director, dissimilarity rate is 
estimated to be two thirds. Object of interest (lecturer) was in 
the case of automatic selection visible throughout the entire 
broadcast of segment. Manual director achieved error rate of 
2% - it means the object was not in the shot in 2% of duration 
of the broadcast segment. The automatic system scored worst 
composition rating then manual direction in 36% of duration 
of broadcast segment. However in 54% of duration of 
broadcast segment the composition of object of interest (figure 
of lecturer) with automatic system has better rating then 
manual direction. In this experiment, the model succeeded 
especially in case of object arrival and disappearance from the 
image, response time was in the case of proposed model faster 
when compared to the manual mode. 
 
Fig. 10. Comparison of evaluation of composition between proposed model 
(blue) and manual direction (red) in 4-camera stream experiment 
 The overall model for the selection of the best image in a 
multi-camera system proposed in this paper is adaptable for 
usage in different types of broadcasts. The primary objective 
was to develop a model for the selection of optimal shot that 
would be useful for heterogeneous multi-camera system, e.g. 
broadcasting of the events from multiple angles using different 
types of devices such as classic camera, mobile phone, sports 
camera, drone, IP camera, etc. (Fig. 11) 
 
Fig. 11. Example of use case of proposed model 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the innovative model for automatic selection 
of the most suitable shot regarding the object of interest in the 
multi-camera system was proposed. Depth analysis of the 
current streaming and computer vision technology lead to a 
proposal of evaluation metrics for individual broadcast 
sources. The proposed evaluation metric was adapted to a 
different types of uses through changing the value of weights 
of individual metric components. Overall, the evaluation of 
multi-camera system sources is derived from several factors: 
the current position and size of the reference object in the shot, 
the parameters of the video broadcast and audio track, lastly 
also the objective and subjective evaluation by viewers. 
Described evaluation metrics became the basis for the 
establishment of a system for the selection of the most suitable 
shot and related switching of the output streaming source in a 
real-time. The created model was experimentally verified in a 
number of alternative implementations using standard and 
mobile devices. The results compared with the standard 
manual director showed the advantages of model in the form 
of faster response time to changes in a shot and a tendency to 
capture the object of interest in the image when being closest 
to the ideal composition. Experimental testing has shown the 
ability of adaptation the model for different types of 
applications, such as broadcast sporting events, security 
systems, industrial monitoring or conference broadcasts. 
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Android APK on-the-fly tampering
Zdeněk Řı́ha, Dušan Klinec, Vashek Matyáš
Abstract—The Android operating system is widely deployed
and relied upon by both providers and users of various ap-
plications. These applications get frequently downloaded from
other sources than just Google Play. This makes Android and
its application treatment a popular target for attackers. We
first present an automated offline attack injecting a previously
prepared code to a previously unseen Android application instal-
lation file (APK) in an automatic manner. Moreover, we present a
novel transparent on-the-fly extension of our attack when a proxy
server performs code injection during a new APK download.
Index Terms—Android security, application security, applica-
tion download, code injection, malware contamination
I. INTRODUCTION
The Android mobile operating system has penetrated 88%
of the smartphone operating system market by 2016 [5]. The
bare operating system as delivered by phone manufacturers
typically provides just a basic functionality. Therefore, it
is more-or-less expected that most users install additional
applications either to enhance smartphone features or just for
fun. The official way to obtain Android applications is to use
the Google Play service. Android phones use the pre-installed
application (client) that directly connects to Google Play
servers. Alternative sources of applications are also supported,
but this feature is disabled by default for security reasons.
Still, many users activate the feature allowing installation
of applications from other (often unknown) sources to be
able to install applications with alternative distribution models,
not present on the Google Play Store (e.g., tourist guide
applications are often distributed locally on-site in places
without Internet access).
Various and numerous applications are banned from the
distribution in Google Play (e.g., advanced security scanners
software requiring root privileges, copyright infringement ma-
terials, advertising blocking applications or even privacy tools
aimed at stopping other applications from collecting data on
users).
We demonstrate two methods of automatically injecting
attacker’s code (e.g., backdoor) into the APK files transpar-
ently to the user. See the high-level architecture of the typical
attacker’s setup in Figure 1. The user would see the APK
download phase progress as usual, but receive a modified file.
Since “free” installation of applications from ad hoc sources is
a crucial feature for Android smartphones, we raise this issue
to both the user and developer communities.
Motivations of the attackers to inject a malware into An-
droid applications can vary. The malware can have the form
of a spyware, leaking the location of the user, SMS messages
Affiliation: Masaryk University, Faculty of Informatics, Botanicka 68a, CZ-
602 00 Brno, Czechia. (zriha | xklinec | matyas @fi.muni.cz)
Fig. 1. The high-level architecture of our attacker’s setup. The infrastructure
for the Internet access (typically a WiFi access point) is under the control of
an attacker who can manipulate unprotected communication.
and other sensitive user data, etc.; botnet client, transforming
the mobile phone into a zombie, or anything else that can lead
to economic or other profit (e.g., Bitcoin mining).
APK file integrity is protected with a digital signature.
The list of hashes for practically all the files in a package
is digitally signed and stored as a PKCS#7/CMS signature
file (including the X.509 certificate of the signer). The digital
signature is verified during the installation process and if
the verification fails then the installation is aborted. This
mechanism is able to detect integrity issues within the APK file
(e.g., missing files, extra files or modified files) and addresses
download errors (e.g., a truncated APK file).
Experience from other application domains (most notably,
but not exclusively, the SSL/TLS) shows that users have
serious issues when having to make decisions about Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) tasks and questions [6], [15]. Android
is based on a very simplified PKI.
For the APK files, the signer certificate is self-signed and is
generated by a developer without any aid of a Certification
Authority (CA). When a new application (a new package
name) is installed, any certificate is accepted. The signer’s
certificate is only important in some particular situations – the
signer must be the same when upgrading an application, to
allow applications to run in the same process and to share
code or data between applications through permissions.
In our scenario, we assume that the user is downloading and
installing a new application. Therefore, it is easily possible to
modify the content of an APK file and afterwards to sign it
with a different private key of attacker’s choice.
As no CA is involved, the values of the name fields in
the (public key) certificate can be arbitrarily chosen by the
attacker. To sign the application, we use the same jarsigner
utility (part of the Java Development Kit) that developers
use. We generated a new private key and certificate for our
experiment described below.
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application (client) that directly connects to Google Play
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applications are often distributed locally on-site in places
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Various and numerous applications are banned from the
distribution in Google Play (e.g., advanced security scanners
software requiring root privileges, copyright infringement ma-
terials, advertising blocking applications or even privacy tools
aimed at stopping other applications from collecting data on
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We demonstrate two methods of automatically injecting
attacker’s code (e.g., backdoor) into the APK files transpar-
ently to the user. See the high-level architecture of the typical
attacker’s setup in Figure 1. The user would see the APK
download phase progress as usual, but receive a modified file.
Since “free” installation of applications from ad hoc sources is
a crucial feature for Android smartphones, we raise this issue
to both the user and developer communities.
Motivations of the attackers to inject a malware into An-
droid applications can vary. The malware can have the form
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and other sensitive user data, etc.; botnet client, transforming
the mobile phone into a zombie, or anything else that can lead
to economic or other profit (e.g., Bitcoin mining).
APK file integrity is protected with a digital signature.
The list of hashes for practically all the files in a package
is digitally signed and stored as a PKCS#7/CMS signature
file (including the X.509 certificate of the signer). The digital
signature is verified during the installation process and if
the verification fails then the installation is aborted. This
mechanism is able to detect integrity issues within the APK file
(e.g., missing files, extra files or modified files) and addresses
download errors (e.g., a truncated APK file).
Experience from other application domains (most notably,
but not exclusively, the SSL/TLS) shows that users have
serious issues when having to make decisions about Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) tasks and questions [6], [15]. Android
is based on a very simplified PKI.
For the APK files, the signer certificate is self-signed and is
generated by a developer without any aid of a Certification
Authority (CA). When a new application (a new package
name) is installed, any certificate is accepted. The signer’s
certificate is only important in some particular situations – the
signer must be the same when upgrading an application, to
allow applications to run in the same process and to share
code or data between applications through permissions.
In our scenario, we assume that the user is downloading and
installing a new application. Therefore, it is easily possible to
modify the content of an APK file and afterwards to sign it
with a different private key of attacker’s choice.
As no CA is involved, the values of the name fields in
the (public key) certificate can be arbitrarily chosen by the
attacker. To sign the application, we use the same jarsigner
utility (part of the Java Development Kit) that developers
use. We generated a new private key and certificate for our
experiment described below.
Zdeněk Říha, Dušan Klinec and Vashek Matyáš
ndroid  fl  ta pering
Android APK on-the-fly tampering




• Manifest: Metadata including versions, permissions and
bindings (file AndroidManifest.xml);
• Compiled portable code: Java classes in DEX format (file
classes.dex);
• Compiled native code: Platform dependent compiled code
– separate folders for particular platforms (folder lib and
its subfolders);
• Precompiled resources: For example compiled XML files
(file resources.arsc);
• Other resources: Images, icons, sounds, etc. (folders res
and assests);
• Package integrity data: The digital signature (folder
META-INF).
In the offline APK modification we automate the use of
commonly available Java tools to decompose the APK file,
modify the package content and build the APK again.
In the very first step, we call the apktool to decompile
the package. This leads to unzipping of the file structure,
conversion of binary XML files to textual formats (including
the AndrodManifest.xml file) and disassembly of the
classes.dex file (containing all compiled Java classes)
into the so-called smali files (textual versions of the Dalvik
bytecode).
The apktool provides a good compatibility for the APK ma-
nipulation, but there are some packages that fail to decompile
with apktool. This basically sets the success rate of the attacks.
Particular numbers depend significantly on the source of the
database of APK files and also on the version of the apktool. In
a database of 500 APKs downloaded from the zippyshare.com
about 15% of the APK files fail to decompile with the apktool.
The next step of the offline attack is the smali files
modification. In this phase we use the pre-prepared smali
code we would like to inject. Those are added to other
disassembled smali files. Usually we also need to modify
the existing smali files in order to start the malicious code
automatically after the application startup, to provide binding
to the original code or to register to system events. Smali
file modification is straightforward and also automated. In
our scenario we tested starting a new service and registering
for interesting intents (e.g., ACTION BOOT COMPLETED,
SMS RECEIVED). The new functionality (the new service) is
separate from the original code and there is no aim to actually
modify the original functionality, so chances of unintended
interactions/malfunctions are very low. We particularly need
to avoid naming collisions.
The AndroidManifest.xml has to be modified in the
following cases: a) our code needs permissions missing in the
original application, then we add the required permissions;
b) new service/activity/IntentReceiver is added, it has to be
registered in AndroidManifest.xml. Once the modifica-
tion is finished, the assembly process takes place to create a
tampered APK. This includes calling the apktool to compile
the AndroidManifest.xml and smali files. Then the
whole package is signed with a newly generated asymmetric
key using the jarsigner utility. An optional step is to use the
zipalign utility that aligns zip entries at 4B boundaries. The
result of this process is a tampered APK file with the injected
code, still correctly signed with a new certificate and private
key.
IV. ONLINE APK MODIFICATION
The previous approach works well in cases where the
attacker has got a big repository of APK files available so they
can be infected and then provided to users. A more universal
approach is to build a proxy server that modifies on-the-fly the
APKs being downloaded in order not to raise any suspicion of
users about the potential malicious activities being performed
on the APK file during the download process.
The online attack works in the streaming mode. Thus the
APK file being downloaded is read by our proxy and on the
other end the proxy produces an infected APK file. The main
idea of this process is the re-ordering of files inside the APK
ZIP file structure.
Usually there is no need to modify resource files in the
APK and typically the resource files occupy a non-negligible
amount of space in the APK. We use this fact to create an
impression of continuous download. Files that have to be
modified (e.g., AndroidManifest.xml, classes.dex,
digital signature files) are stored sideways, postponed from
being sent to the user. The rest of the files (e.g., resources)
are sent to the user directly. We use a stream ZIP parser to
perform this task.
A. Attack launch
Once the whole APK file is available at the proxy side, the
offline attack is launched on to the downloaded APK file. Note
that the user has downloaded only files that are not modified
during the attack and does not have the complete APK file yet.
From the user’s perspective, the download process is still in
progress. When the offline attack finishes, the tampered APK
file is analyzed and files differing from the original APK file
are transmitted to the user. This would normally lead to a
download pattern where a significant part of the APK file is
downloaded with a normal speed, then the connection hangs
for a moment (ranging from seconds to minutes), and then the
download continues with the normal speed again.
To avoid a visible delay in the middle of the download
process, it is possible to artificially reduce the download speed
from the beginning so that the delay in the middle is not
present or minimized.
The main benefit of this approach is that download on the
user side starts quite quickly (i.e., the download progress bar
shows the download has really started). The naı̈ve strategy
would be to use the offline attack on the proxy side and
once the attack finishes the whole infected APK file would
be dumped to the user’s download stream. Yet that could
raise suspicion of users since the modification takes some
time — from a few seconds to a few minutes — the user
would see 0% at the progress bar for a significant time.
This could indicate connectivity problems or indications of
malicious modifications. A cautious user might tend to cancel
the APK download.
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A. Aims and limitations of our work
The core contribution of this paper is a novel approach
for the on-the-fly automated modification of APK files. In
the case of the offline APK modification we assume to have
the complete APK file at our disposal (i.e., fully downloaded
file) and run a script to inject the payload. Yet our primary
contribution comes with the demonstration of a code injection
(at a proxy) – the online version of the modification modifies
the APK on-the-fly while being downloaded from a remote
server to the Android device of the victim (i.e., during the man-
in-the-middle attack). The online modification must create an
impression of a continuous download of the APK. To our
best knowledge, the on-the-fly attack is a novel approach not
published before.
Our paper investigates the security consequences of the
feature allowing for installation of applications from unknown
sources and presents a way how to automatically inject mal-
ware into Android applications. Security of the Google Play
service is out of the scope of this paper.
Our ultimate goal is to demonstrate the ease of injecting
an additional code so that it remains hidden from the phone
user. The process of the code injection (even into previously
unseen applications) is fully automated and the download of
the package is not disrupted from the user point of view.
The process of the modification works in a streaming mode,
changing the APK file on-the-fly.
B. Paper roadmap
In Section II, we map related work on the Android attacks
topic. Section III describes the basic offline variant of the
attack, Section IV outlines the on-the-fly variant of the attack.
Technical details are described in Section V and Section VI
demonstrates the practical usability of the proposed approach
in our experiments. Section VII briefly discusses possible
countermeasures and the following section concludes our
paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The APK file modification is not novel. It has been
demonstrated several times that the APK file can be decom-
pressed, disassembled, modified and then reassembled and
repackaged [25], [1]. There are standard Java tools that can
decompress the APK file, disassemble the compiled Java
classes, recompile the source code and repackage the APK
file including the APK signature generation. The analysis of
the source code and its proper modification usually remains a
manual and case-by-case work.
Code injection was also previously demonstrated with other
executable file formats (e.g., Windows EXE [4]).
In [7] E. Aydogen and S. Sen generate repackaged (obfus-
cated) APK files using apktool. The resulting APK files are
used to evaluate the performance of antivirus systems.
A DroidChameleon framework presented in [23] is a tool
for generating malwared versions of the Android applications
with use of transformation techniques, repackaging and re-
assembling APKs. They tested common antivirus products and
commercial antimalware applications with modified APKs. All
APK modifications are offline, the paper does not discuss on-
the-fly APK manipulations.
ADAM [31] is another malware generator framework that
uses repackaging and obfuscation to generate new malware
samples to stress antivirus products. The paper focuses only
on an offline APK repackaging.
In [18] J. Jeon et al. intruduces Dr. Android and Mr. Hide.
Dr. Android is a tool that removes application permissions
and replaces them with calls of fine-grade variants accesible
through Mr. Hide (a set of Android services). Dr. Android is
based on the apktool (to repackage the application) and redexer
(to transform the Dalvik bytecode).
AppSpear [28] is rebuilding packed and protected applica-
tions into normal form so that they can be analyzed by standard
tools.
APK files are often decompiled to analyze the behaviour
of applications. In [13] W. Enck et al. presented the ded
tool for decompiling Android DEX code to the Java source
codes and carried a static code analysis on 1100 Android
applications with the Fortify tool. In [8] L. Batyuk et al.
statically analyze the bytecode and produce precise security
reports. P. Bertholome et al. [9] extend the work and not only
reports the situations where the user’s privacy can be disclose,
but also inject a new code to allow use to decide whether he
want to prevent the operation.
Many Android vulnerabilities have been published in the
past few years, but APK related vulnerabilities are not that
numerous. The most serious bug on this topic is the so-
called Android Master Key vulnerability [16] affecting APK
installation in such a way that the tampered package is
accepted as a valid one. The vulnerability is based on the
fact that the APK file, having the ZIP structure, can contain
multiple entries of the same name, this is quite unusual, but
generally allowed in ZIP files. The existence of such duplicates
is not explicitly checked by the installer. The APK installer
and the signature verifier are separate components, each using
a different third-party ZIP parsing library.
The core problem is that the signature verifier takes into
consideration the first ZIP file entry while the installer takes
the last one. Exploiting this vulnerability is straightforward.
Taking an original APK file, it is sufficient to insert infected
files as second ZIP entries with duplicate names. As a result,
the original ZIP entries are verified while the infected files
are being installed. The Android Master Key vulnerability is
a serious bug that has been fixed in the Android version 4.3
(Jelly Bean).
The Android Master Key vulnerability is an effective way
to infect an APK file. The core advantage of this approach is
based on the fact that no modification of the original signature
is required (even if the installed content has actually changed).
Our approach is also based on the fact that APK file has a
ZIP structure but we are not using the Android Master Key
vulnerability, instead we are generating a new signature as we
are changing some files inside the APK.
III. OFFLINE APK MODIFICATION
Android applications are distributed in the form of APK [2]
files. APK has internally a ZIP structure that includes primarily
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the following elements:
• Manifest: Metadata including versions, permissions and
bindings (file AndroidManifest.xml);
• Compiled portable code: Java classes in DEX format (file
classes.dex);
• Compiled native code: Platform dependent compiled code
– separate folders for particular platforms (folder lib and
its subfolders);
• Precompiled resources: For example compiled XML files
(file resources.arsc);
• Other resources: Images, icons, sounds, etc. (folders res
and assests);
• Package integrity data: The digital signature (folder
META-INF).
In the offline APK modification we automate the use of
commonly available Java tools to decompose the APK file,
modify the package content and build the APK again.
In the very first step, we call the apktool to decompile
the package. This leads to unzipping of the file structure,
conversion of binary XML files to textual formats (including
the AndrodManifest.xml file) and disassembly of the
classes.dex file (containing all compiled Java classes)
into the so-called smali files (textual versions of the Dalvik
bytecode).
The apktool provides a good compatibility for the APK ma-
nipulation, but there are some packages that fail to decompile
with apktool. This basically sets the success rate of the attacks.
Particular numbers depend significantly on the source of the
database of APK files and also on the version of the apktool. In
a database of 500 APKs downloaded from the zippyshare.com
about 15% of the APK files fail to decompile with the apktool.
The next step of the offline attack is the smali files
modification. In this phase we use the pre-prepared smali
code we would like to inject. Those are added to other
disassembled smali files. Usually we also need to modify
the existing smali files in order to start the malicious code
automatically after the application startup, to provide binding
to the original code or to register to system events. Smali
file modification is straightforward and also automated. In
our scenario we tested starting a new service and registering
for interesting intents (e.g., ACTION BOOT COMPLETED,
SMS RECEIVED). The new functionality (the new service) is
separate from the original code and there is no aim to actually
modify the original functionality, so chances of unintended
interactions/malfunctions are very low. We particularly need
to avoid naming collisions.
The AndroidManifest.xml has to be modified in the
following cases: a) our code needs permissions missing in the
original application, then we add the required permissions;
b) new service/activity/IntentReceiver is added, it has to be
registered in AndroidManifest.xml. Once the modifica-
tion is finished, the assembly process takes place to create a
tampered APK. This includes calling the apktool to compile
the AndroidManifest.xml and smali files. Then the
whole package is signed with a newly generated asymmetric
key using the jarsigner utility. An optional step is to use the
zipalign utility that aligns zip entries at 4B boundaries. The
result of this process is a tampered APK file with the injected
code, still correctly signed with a new certificate and private
key.
IV. ONLINE APK MODIFICATION
The previous approach works well in cases where the
attacker has got a big repository of APK files available so they
can be infected and then provided to users. A more universal
approach is to build a proxy server that modifies on-the-fly the
APKs being downloaded in order not to raise any suspicion of
users about the potential malicious activities being performed
on the APK file during the download process.
The online attack works in the streaming mode. Thus the
APK file being downloaded is read by our proxy and on the
other end the proxy produces an infected APK file. The main
idea of this process is the re-ordering of files inside the APK
ZIP file structure.
Usually there is no need to modify resource files in the
APK and typically the resource files occupy a non-negligible
amount of space in the APK. We use this fact to create an
impression of continuous download. Files that have to be
modified (e.g., AndroidManifest.xml, classes.dex,
digital signature files) are stored sideways, postponed from
being sent to the user. The rest of the files (e.g., resources)
are sent to the user directly. We use a stream ZIP parser to
perform this task.
A. Attack launch
Once the whole APK file is available at the proxy side, the
offline attack is launched on to the downloaded APK file. Note
that the user has downloaded only files that are not modified
during the attack and does not have the complete APK file yet.
From the user’s perspective, the download process is still in
progress. When the offline attack finishes, the tampered APK
file is analyzed and files differing from the original APK file
are transmitted to the user. This would normally lead to a
download pattern where a significant part of the APK file is
downloaded with a normal speed, then the connection hangs
for a moment (ranging from seconds to minutes), and then the
download continues with the normal speed again.
To avoid a visible delay in the middle of the download
process, it is possible to artificially reduce the download speed
from the beginning so that the delay in the middle is not
present or minimized.
The main benefit of this approach is that download on the
user side starts quite quickly (i.e., the download progress bar
shows the download has really started). The naı̈ve strategy
would be to use the offline attack on the proxy side and
once the attack finishes the whole infected APK file would
be dumped to the user’s download stream. Yet that could
raise suspicion of users since the modification takes some
time — from a few seconds to a few minutes — the user
would see 0% at the progress bar for a significant time.
This could indicate connectivity problems or indications of
malicious modifications. A cautious user might tend to cancel
the APK download.
2
A. Aims and limitations of our work
The core contribution of this paper is a novel approach
for the on-the-fly automated modification of APK files. In
the case of the offline APK modification we assume to have
the complete APK file at our disposal (i.e., fully downloaded
file) and run a script to inject the payload. Yet our primary
contribution comes with the demonstration of a code injection
(at a proxy) – the online version of the modification modifies
the APK on-the-fly while being downloaded from a remote
server to the Android device of the victim (i.e., during the man-
in-the-middle attack). The online modification must create an
impression of a continuous download of the APK. To our
best knowledge, the on-the-fly attack is a novel approach not
published before.
Our paper investigates the security consequences of the
feature allowing for installation of applications from unknown
sources and presents a way how to automatically inject mal-
ware into Android applications. Security of the Google Play
service is out of the scope of this paper.
Our ultimate goal is to demonstrate the ease of injecting
an additional code so that it remains hidden from the phone
user. The process of the code injection (even into previously
unseen applications) is fully automated and the download of
the package is not disrupted from the user point of view.
The process of the modification works in a streaming mode,
changing the APK file on-the-fly.
B. Paper roadmap
In Section II, we map related work on the Android attacks
topic. Section III describes the basic offline variant of the
attack, Section IV outlines the on-the-fly variant of the attack.
Technical details are described in Section V and Section VI
demonstrates the practical usability of the proposed approach
in our experiments. Section VII briefly discusses possible
countermeasures and the following section concludes our
paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The APK file modification is not novel. It has been
demonstrated several times that the APK file can be decom-
pressed, disassembled, modified and then reassembled and
repackaged [25], [1]. There are standard Java tools that can
decompress the APK file, disassemble the compiled Java
classes, recompile the source code and repackage the APK
file including the APK signature generation. The analysis of
the source code and its proper modification usually remains a
manual and case-by-case work.
Code injection was also previously demonstrated with other
executable file formats (e.g., Windows EXE [4]).
In [7] E. Aydogen and S. Sen generate repackaged (obfus-
cated) APK files using apktool. The resulting APK files are
used to evaluate the performance of antivirus systems.
A DroidChameleon framework presented in [23] is a tool
for generating malwared versions of the Android applications
with use of transformation techniques, repackaging and re-
assembling APKs. They tested common antivirus products and
commercial antimalware applications with modified APKs. All
APK modifications are offline, the paper does not discuss on-
the-fly APK manipulations.
ADAM [31] is another malware generator framework that
uses repackaging and obfuscation to generate new malware
samples to stress antivirus products. The paper focuses only
on an offline APK repackaging.
In [18] J. Jeon et al. intruduces Dr. Android and Mr. Hide.
Dr. Android is a tool that removes application permissions
and replaces them with calls of fine-grade variants accesible
through Mr. Hide (a set of Android services). Dr. Android is
based on the apktool (to repackage the application) and redexer
(to transform the Dalvik bytecode).
AppSpear [28] is rebuilding packed and protected applica-
tions into normal form so that they can be analyzed by standard
tools.
APK files are often decompiled to analyze the behaviour
of applications. In [13] W. Enck et al. presented the ded
tool for decompiling Android DEX code to the Java source
codes and carried a static code analysis on 1100 Android
applications with the Fortify tool. In [8] L. Batyuk et al.
statically analyze the bytecode and produce precise security
reports. P. Bertholome et al. [9] extend the work and not only
reports the situations where the user’s privacy can be disclose,
but also inject a new code to allow use to decide whether he
want to prevent the operation.
Many Android vulnerabilities have been published in the
past few years, but APK related vulnerabilities are not that
numerous. The most serious bug on this topic is the so-
called Android Master Key vulnerability [16] affecting APK
installation in such a way that the tampered package is
accepted as a valid one. The vulnerability is based on the
fact that the APK file, having the ZIP structure, can contain
multiple entries of the same name, this is quite unusual, but
generally allowed in ZIP files. The existence of such duplicates
is not explicitly checked by the installer. The APK installer
and the signature verifier are separate components, each using
a different third-party ZIP parsing library.
The core problem is that the signature verifier takes into
consideration the first ZIP file entry while the installer takes
the last one. Exploiting this vulnerability is straightforward.
Taking an original APK file, it is sufficient to insert infected
files as second ZIP entries with duplicate names. As a result,
the original ZIP entries are verified while the infected files
are being installed. The Android Master Key vulnerability is
a serious bug that has been fixed in the Android version 4.3
(Jelly Bean).
The Android Master Key vulnerability is an effective way
to infect an APK file. The core advantage of this approach is
based on the fact that no modification of the original signature
is required (even if the installed content has actually changed).
Our approach is also based on the fact that APK file has a
ZIP structure but we are not using the Android Master Key
vulnerability, instead we are generating a new signature as we
are changing some files inside the APK.
III. OFFLINE APK MODIFICATION
Android applications are distributed in the form of APK [2]
files. APK has internally a ZIP structure that includes primarily
















utility (‘C’) 293 kB 793 kB 1 s 13 s 51 s
Game (‘F’) 4126 kB 4626 kB 2 s 19 s 53 s
Antivirus
solution (‘E’) 3523 kB 4023 kB 2 s 31 s 62 s
TABLE I
THE TIME STATISTICS OF THE DOWNLOAD PROCESS OF THREE TYPES OF APPLICATIONS.
slowing down the user download speed from the beginning so
that the on-the-fly modification can be masked by a slow link
behavior.
Table I illustrates the times needed to download our sample
APK files (injecting a sample privacy-related malicious code):
• File ‘C’ is a very basic navigation utility.
• File ‘F’ is a basic game with rich graphics and a simple
logic.
• File ‘E’ is a leading provider’s antivirus solution with a
complex code.
These three files represent various characteristics of appli-
cations, in particular the size of the application and the
proportion of the code and resources. Note that the sizes of
files ‘E’ and ‘F’ are similar, but the processing times of the
files differ significantly. We need to emphasize that the most
time consuming part of this effort is the DEX file processing.
The more Java code (the larger the classes.dex file) the
longer the package processing takes as the decompilation and
compilation of the Java/smali code is more complex than
processing of other files (e.g., images and other resources).
This explains the longer processing time of the file ‘E’, which
contains more Java code than file ‘F’.
Our tests were performed using a very low performance
computer to imitate single purpose devices acting as routers
or access points (e.g., Linux based APs). A more powerful
computer can perform better. E.g., we ran some of the tests
on a notebook based on Intel Core i7-3540 (3GHz) and an
SSD disc – such a setting can reduce the modification times
by about one half.
The speed limitation needs to estimate the ideal speed that
can be achieved constantly. The time needed to process the
package depends on the proportion of the files that need not
be modified (and can be therefore sent directly) and files
that will be (potentially) modified (and will be sent after the
package modification and resigning). The speed also depends
on the size of the Java code that significantly influences the
decompilation and compilation times. Setting the compression
level may introduce another dimension to choose between the
compression level and slowdown in the modification/transfer
speed.
Figure 2 demonstrates one of the performed tests. It rep-
resents the download process of the file ‘F’ in three tested
situations. The green (solid) graph line shows the download
without the proxy, the red (dotted) line shows the download
process when the proxy modifies the file, and the yellow
(dashed) line shows the download process with a modified
file and with the speed limitation enabled. Note that the file
size of the modified file is about 500 kB bigger (the injected
code is accessing local resources/data and transmitting them
to a remote server).
Our speed estimate is conservative and is suitable also for
packages with a larger amount of Java code (like the file ‘E’).
Looking at Figure 2, it is possible to conclude that in this
particular case the download speed could be faster and the
download would still not suffer from the download stall in the
middle.
VII. POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES
The simplest countermeasure is to use the SSL/TLS to
protect the communication (e.g., the HTTPS protocol). The
security issues of SSL/TLS (including possible attacks) are
out of the scope of this paper.
Requesting permissions at run time in newer versions of
Android may reveal undesired hidden functionality of an
application, but only if that feature is active and the user pays
attention to the popping up messages.
The application can check the signing certificate at runtime
(so called certificate pinning) [3]. An attacker could modify the
reference certificate during the repackaging attack, but doing
so automatically would assume a particular process of the
certificate verification in the application.
Y. Zhauniarovich et al. [29] are suggesting the use of a
secondary signature of the APK file that would be added by the
application store. This method requires a trusted certificate of
the store to be available in the Android before the application
installation.
M. Conti et al. introduce OASIS [11], a trusted component
processing sensitive data on behalf of applications. Appli-
cations cannot access data directly, but only via a handle.
Therefore the OASIS system can enforce complex policies
like allowing access to contacts to display them but prohibiting
sending contacts over the Internet (even if Internet access is
generally allowed).
Increasingly popular are anti-decompilation, anti-cracking
and anti-reverse-engineering mechanisms. These can be as
simple as calling one particular method in the Java code (e.g.,
[27]) or more complex (e.g., [22], [28]).
A detection that the APK file was modified and repackaged
can be based on multiple principles. A significant effort has
been spent to detect repackaged APK files in Android markets.
In these cases researchers and providers have a large number
of APK files and analyze their statistical properties, e.g.,
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B. File size issue
There are two major ways of transfer encoding using
HTTP as the download protocol. The server can use either
the chunked encoding or the normal mode. In the chunked
encoding, the overall content length of the payload is not
sent to the user in the HTTP headers. This mode of trans-
port enables to generate the content dynamically or support
scenarios where the content length is not known to the server
at the beginning. The downside of this approach is the missing
progress illustration of the download. The other option is to use
the normal transfer encoding with the content length header
present among the HTTP headers.
Since we want to mimic the normal file download with the
progress displayed to the user, we need to use the latter option.
The problem is that the APK modification inflates the APK
file by some amount of data, from bytes to kilobytes. Since
estimation of the difference of the file sizes is not reliable,
we cannot tell the resulting APK file size precisely before the
APK tampering takes place.
Our approach is to estimate the resulting APK size by
adding some extra space as a reserve. It should hold that
real APK size is smaller than the APK size sent in headers,
otherwise the user receives an incomplete and thus invalid
APK file. Then we have additional bytes of data that need
to be added to the APK somehow. Each ZIP file entry has
an Extra field according to the ZIP standard [21]. This Extra
field is of a variable size, taking at most 65535 B. It serves for
storing a special application/platform information in a ZIP file
and provides extensibility to the ZIP format. In most APK files
it is usually unused. This is the place where we put additional
bytes to obtain a “padded” version of the APK file where file
size matches the one sent in the beginning of the transfer.
Padding is done once the APK tampering has been finished
on the server side and the size of padding bytes is calculated.
In this phase of the attack we have the list of files that need to
be sent to the victim. The padding bytes are spread across the
extra fields of this file entries and sent to the user. As the ZIP
structure itself is not a subject of the signature the padding or
the order of files in the ZIP does not affect the sigature of the
package.
V. TECHNICAL DETAILS
The offline attack as described above was implemented in
Java. The attacker has to prepare the code to be injected.
The code being injected needs to be expressed in the smali
language, but an attacker can prepare the malware code in Java,
compile it (using standard development tools) and decompile
it (using the apktool) to obtain the needed smali code. This
needs to be done only once and the same malware smali code
can be injected into many APK files.
The offline attack wraps the whole process of decom-
pression, decompilation, injection, compilation, signature and
compression. The process is a simple sequence of a few
steps heavily using the standard apktool utility, thus providing
good compatibility with APK files of various types. The
disadvantages of the utility include the complexity (of what
it is doing in a single command) and therefore also relatively
slow speed.
The online attack was also implemented in order to demon-
strate its applicability. Please note that it works only for HTTP,
not for HTTPS. In our setup we have used a dedicated proxy
server (a Fedora Linux box1) with two network interfaces.
Interface 1 is an Ethernet type connected to the Internet.
Interface 2 is a WiFi card for a hotspot emulation. We
have chosen the hostap2 software that emulates a wireless
access point on this interface.
The hostap is connected to the TinyProxy3, which is an
open-source lightweight transparent proxy. We modified the
source code of the TinyProxy to hook all HTTP GET re-
quests for files with the APK extension. If an APK is being
downloaded, it invokes the Java implementation of the online
attack and passes the download stream to its standard input
while sending its standard output to the user. TinyProxy also
estimates the final file size of the APK after modification by
adding a fixed amount of bytes to the total size.
The online attack application is written in Java, using the
ZIP stream parser from the Apache Commons4 Library. It
implements the attack described earlier, together with a simple
download speed limit algorithm.
Our testbed implementation is placed into public domain
under the Apache License v2 hosted on GitHub:
https://github.com/ph4r05/ZIPStream.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
In order to validate our approach, we tested our setup with
a dozen of real APK files on real smartphones (Samsung
Galaxy S3, HTC One X, Samsung Galaxy S2 mini, Motorola
Moto G and Sony XPeria Z2) with Android of versions 2.3.7,
4.2.2, 4.3, 4.4.4 and 5.0.2. The principles of the APK file
modification are independent on the Android version and do
not depend on a particular vulnerability of the OS. As long as
the signature of the APK file can be made by any signer, the
attack will basically work. All tested APK files worked on all
tested phones.
As the repackaging itself is automated, it is easy to perform
in a larger scale. We repackaged over 100 of APK files.
On other hand, installation, running and verification that the
original functionality of the APK was not affected is a manual
work. We tested that on few dozens of applications.
Our tests aim to show the times needed to download sample
APK files. We performed these tests with our transparent proxy
server connected to a fast local network with the web server.
The download of the original file that was not intervened by
the proxy server was very fast. When the file was modified
on-the-fly on the server then the modification needed a non-
trivial amount of time and the download took significantly
more time (and the file being downloaded was larger). The
on-the-fly modification suffers from a well visible signature
of the download process when the download practically stops
for a long moment. Our solution to this problem is based on
1The basic hardware configuration was intentionally chosen as a low
performance (router-like) computer: Intel Pentium 4 CPU 3GHz Dual Core,



















utility (‘C’) 293 kB 793 kB 1 s 13 s 51 s
Game (‘F’) 4126 kB 4626 kB 2 s 19 s 53 s
Antivirus
solution (‘E’) 3523 kB 4023 kB 2 s 31 s 62 s
TABLE I
THE TIME STATISTICS OF THE DOWNLOAD PROCESS OF THREE TYPES OF APPLICATIONS.
slowing down the user download speed from the beginning so
that the on-the-fly modification can be masked by a slow link
behavior.
Table I illustrates the times needed to download our sample
APK files (injecting a sample privacy-related malicious code):
• File ‘C’ is a very basic navigation utility.
• File ‘F’ is a basic game with rich graphics and a simple
logic.
• File ‘E’ is a leading provider’s antivirus solution with a
complex code.
These three files represent various characteristics of appli-
cations, in particular the size of the application and the
proportion of the code and resources. Note that the sizes of
files ‘E’ and ‘F’ are similar, but the processing times of the
files differ significantly. We need to emphasize that the most
time consuming part of this effort is the DEX file processing.
The more Java code (the larger the classes.dex file) the
longer the package processing takes as the decompilation and
compilation of the Java/smali code is more complex than
processing of other files (e.g., images and other resources).
This explains the longer processing time of the file ‘E’, which
contains more Java code than file ‘F’.
Our tests were performed using a very low performance
computer to imitate single purpose devices acting as routers
or access points (e.g., Linux based APs). A more powerful
computer can perform better. E.g., we ran some of the tests
on a notebook based on Intel Core i7-3540 (3GHz) and an
SSD disc – such a setting can reduce the modification times
by about one half.
The speed limitation needs to estimate the ideal speed that
can be achieved constantly. The time needed to process the
package depends on the proportion of the files that need not
be modified (and can be therefore sent directly) and files
that will be (potentially) modified (and will be sent after the
package modification and resigning). The speed also depends
on the size of the Java code that significantly influences the
decompilation and compilation times. Setting the compression
level may introduce another dimension to choose between the
compression level and slowdown in the modification/transfer
speed.
Figure 2 demonstrates one of the performed tests. It rep-
resents the download process of the file ‘F’ in three tested
situations. The green (solid) graph line shows the download
without the proxy, the red (dotted) line shows the download
process when the proxy modifies the file, and the yellow
(dashed) line shows the download process with a modified
file and with the speed limitation enabled. Note that the file
size of the modified file is about 500 kB bigger (the injected
code is accessing local resources/data and transmitting them
to a remote server).
Our speed estimate is conservative and is suitable also for
packages with a larger amount of Java code (like the file ‘E’).
Looking at Figure 2, it is possible to conclude that in this
particular case the download speed could be faster and the
download would still not suffer from the download stall in the
middle.
VII. POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES
The simplest countermeasure is to use the SSL/TLS to
protect the communication (e.g., the HTTPS protocol). The
security issues of SSL/TLS (including possible attacks) are
out of the scope of this paper.
Requesting permissions at run time in newer versions of
Android may reveal undesired hidden functionality of an
application, but only if that feature is active and the user pays
attention to the popping up messages.
The application can check the signing certificate at runtime
(so called certificate pinning) [3]. An attacker could modify the
reference certificate during the repackaging attack, but doing
so automatically would assume a particular process of the
certificate verification in the application.
Y. Zhauniarovich et al. [29] are suggesting the use of a
secondary signature of the APK file that would be added by the
application store. This method requires a trusted certificate of
the store to be available in the Android before the application
installation.
M. Conti et al. introduce OASIS [11], a trusted component
processing sensitive data on behalf of applications. Appli-
cations cannot access data directly, but only via a handle.
Therefore the OASIS system can enforce complex policies
like allowing access to contacts to display them but prohibiting
sending contacts over the Internet (even if Internet access is
generally allowed).
Increasingly popular are anti-decompilation, anti-cracking
and anti-reverse-engineering mechanisms. These can be as
simple as calling one particular method in the Java code (e.g.,
[27]) or more complex (e.g., [22], [28]).
A detection that the APK file was modified and repackaged
can be based on multiple principles. A significant effort has
been spent to detect repackaged APK files in Android markets.
In these cases researchers and providers have a large number
of APK files and analyze their statistical properties, e.g.,
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slowing down the user download speed from the beginning so
that the on-the-fly modification can be masked by a slow link
behavior.
Table I illustrates the times needed to download our sample
APK files (injecting a sample privacy-related malicious code):
• File ‘C’ is a very basic navigation utility.
• File ‘F’ is a basic game with rich graphics and a simple
logic.
• File ‘E’ is a leading provider’s antivirus solution with a
complex code.
These three files represent various characteristics of appli-
cations, in particular the size of the application and the
proportion of the code and resources. Note that the sizes of
files ‘E’ and ‘F’ are similar, but the processing times of the
files differ significantly. We need to emphasize that the most
time consuming part of this effort is the DEX file processing.
The more Java code (the larger the classes.dex file) the
longer the package processing takes as the decompilation and
compilation of the Java/smali code is more complex than
processing of other files (e.g., images and other resources).
This explains the longer processing time of the file ‘E’, which
contains more Java code than file ‘F’.
Our tests were performed using a very low performance
computer to imitate single purpose devices acting as routers
or access points (e.g., Linux based APs). A more powerful
computer can perform better. E.g., we ran some of the tests
on a notebook based on Intel Core i7-3540 (3GHz) and an
SSD disc – such a setting can reduce the modification times
by about one half.
The speed limitation needs to estimate the ideal speed that
can be achieved constantly. The time needed to process the
package depends on the proportion of the files that need not
be modified (and can be therefore sent directly) and files
that will be (potentially) modified (and will be sent after the
package modification and resigning). The speed also depends
on the size of the Java code that significantly influences the
decompilation and compilation times. Setting the compression
level may introduce another dimension to choose between the
compression level and slowdown in the modification/transfer
speed.
Figure 2 demonstrates one of the performed tests. It rep-
resents the download process of the file ‘F’ in three tested
situations. The green (solid) graph line shows the download
without the proxy, the red (dotted) line shows the download
process when the proxy modifies the file, and the yellow
(dashed) line shows the download process with a modified
file and with the speed limitation enabled. Note that the file
size of the modified file is about 500 kB bigger (the injected
code is accessing local resources/data and transmitting them
to a remote server).
Our speed estimate is conservative and is suitable also for
packages with a larger amount of Java code (like the file ‘E’).
Looking at Figure 2, it is possible to conclude that in this
particular case the download speed could be faster and the
download would still not suffer from the download stall in the
middle.
VII. POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES
The simplest countermeasure is to use the SSL/TLS to
protect the communication (e.g., the HTTPS protocol). The
security issues of SSL/TLS (including possible attacks) are
out of the scope of this paper.
Requesting permissions at run time in newer versions of
Android may reveal undesired hidden functionality of an
application, but only if that feature is active and the user pays
attention to the popping up messages.
The application can check the signing certificate at runtime
(so called certificate pinning) [3]. An attacker could modify the
reference certificate during the repackaging attack, but doing
so automatically would assume a particular process of the
certificate verification in the application.
Y. Zhauniarovich et al. [29] are suggesting the use of a
secondary signature of the APK file that would be added by the
application store. This method requires a trusted certificate of
the store to be available in the Android before the application
installation.
M. Conti et al. introduce OASIS [11], a trusted component
processing sensitive data on behalf of applications. Appli-
cations cannot access data directly, but only via a handle.
Therefore the OASIS system can enforce complex policies
like allowing access to contacts to display them but prohibiting
sending contacts over the Internet (even if Internet access is
generally allowed).
Increasingly popular are anti-decompilation, anti-cracking
and anti-reverse-engineering mechanisms. These can be as
simple as calling one particular method in the Java code (e.g.,
[27]) or more complex (e.g., [22], [28]).
A detection that the APK file was modified and repackaged
can be based on multiple principles. A significant effort has
been spent to detect repackaged APK files in Android markets.
In these cases researchers and providers have a large number
of APK files and analyze their statistical properties, e.g.,
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B. File size issue
There are two major ways of transfer encoding using
HTTP as the download protocol. The server can use either
the chunked encoding or the normal mode. In the chunked
encoding, the overall content length of the payload is not
sent to the user in the HTTP headers. This mode of trans-
port enables to generate the content dynamically or support
scenarios where the content length is not known to the server
at the beginning. The downside of this approach is the missing
progress illustration of the download. The other option is to use
the normal transfer encoding with the content length header
present among the HTTP headers.
Since we want to mimic the normal file download with the
progress displayed to the user, we need to use the latter option.
The problem is that the APK modification inflates the APK
file by some amount of data, from bytes to kilobytes. Since
estimation of the difference of the file sizes is not reliable,
we cannot tell the resulting APK file size precisely before the
APK tampering takes place.
Our approach is to estimate the resulting APK size by
adding some extra space as a reserve. It should hold that
real APK size is smaller than the APK size sent in headers,
otherwise the user receives an incomplete and thus invalid
APK file. Then we have additional bytes of data that need
to be added to the APK somehow. Each ZIP file entry has
an Extra field according to the ZIP standard [21]. This Extra
field is of a variable size, taking at most 65535 B. It serves for
storing a special application/platform information in a ZIP file
and provides extensibility to the ZIP format. In most APK files
it is usually unused. This is the place where we put additional
bytes to obtain a “padded” version of the APK file where file
size matches the one sent in the beginning of the transfer.
Padding is done once the APK tampering has been finished
on the server side and the size of padding bytes is calculated.
In this phase of the attack we have the list of files that need to
be sent to the victim. The padding bytes are spread across the
extra fields of this file entries and sent to the user. As the ZIP
structure itself is not a subject of the signature the padding or
the order of files in the ZIP does not affect the sigature of the
package.
V. TECHNICAL DETAILS
The offline attack as described above was implemented in
Java. The attacker has to prepare the code to be injected.
The code being injected needs to be expressed in the smali
language, but an attacker can prepare the malware code in Java,
compile it (using standard development tools) and decompile
it (using the apktool) to obtain the needed smali code. This
needs to be done only once and the same malware smali code
can be injected into many APK files.
The offline attack wraps the whole process of decom-
pression, decompilation, injection, compilation, signature and
compression. The process is a simple sequence of a few
steps heavily using the standard apktool utility, thus providing
good compatibility with APK files of various types. The
disadvantages of the utility include the complexity (of what
it is doing in a single command) and therefore also relatively
slow speed.
The online attack was also implemented in order to demon-
strate its applicability. Please note that it works only for HTTP,
not for HTTPS. In our setup we have used a dedicated proxy
server (a Fedora Linux box1) with two network interfaces.
Interface 1 is an Ethernet type connected to the Internet.
Interface 2 is a WiFi card for a hotspot emulation. We
have chosen the hostap2 software that emulates a wireless
access point on this interface.
The hostap is connected to the TinyProxy3, which is an
open-source lightweight transparent proxy. We modified the
source code of the TinyProxy to hook all HTTP GET re-
quests for files with the APK extension. If an APK is being
downloaded, it invokes the Java implementation of the online
attack and passes the download stream to its standard input
while sending its standard output to the user. TinyProxy also
estimates the final file size of the APK after modification by
adding a fixed amount of bytes to the total size.
The online attack application is written in Java, using the
ZIP stream parser from the Apache Commons4 Library. It
implements the attack described earlier, together with a simple
download speed limit algorithm.
Our testbed implementation is placed into public domain
under the Apache License v2 hosted on GitHub:
https://github.com/ph4r05/ZIPStream.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
In order to validate our approach, we tested our setup with
a dozen of real APK files on real smartphones (Samsung
Galaxy S3, HTC One X, Samsung Galaxy S2 mini, Motorola
Moto G and Sony XPeria Z2) with Android of versions 2.3.7,
4.2.2, 4.3, 4.4.4 and 5.0.2. The principles of the APK file
modification are independent on the Android version and do
not depend on a particular vulnerability of the OS. As long as
the signature of the APK file can be made by any signer, the
attack will basically work. All tested APK files worked on all
tested phones.
As the repackaging itself is automated, it is easy to perform
in a larger scale. We repackaged over 100 of APK files.
On other hand, installation, running and verification that the
original functionality of the APK was not affected is a manual
work. We tested that on few dozens of applications.
Our tests aim to show the times needed to download sample
APK files. We performed these tests with our transparent proxy
server connected to a fast local network with the web server.
The download of the original file that was not intervened by
the proxy server was very fast. When the file was modified
on-the-fly on the server then the modification needed a non-
trivial amount of time and the download took significantly
more time (and the file being downloaded was larger). The
on-the-fly modification suffers from a well visible signature
of the download process when the download practically stops
for a long moment. Our solution to this problem is based on
1The basic hardware configuration was intentionally chosen as a low
performance (router-like) computer: Intel Pentium 4 CPU 3GHz Dual Core,
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slowing down the user download speed from the beginning so
that the on-the-fly modification can be masked by a slow link
behavior.
Table I illustrates the times needed to download our sample
APK files (injecting a sample privacy-related malicious code):
• File ‘C’ is a very basic navigation utility.
• File ‘F’ is a basic game with rich graphics and a simple
logic.
• File ‘E’ is a leading provider’s antivirus solution with a
complex code.
These three files represent various characteristics of appli-
cations, in particular the size of the application and the
proportion of the code and resources. Note that the sizes of
files ‘E’ and ‘F’ are similar, but the processing times of the
files differ significantly. We need to emphasize that the most
time consuming part of this effort is the DEX file processing.
The more Java code (the larger the classes.dex file) the
longer the package processing takes as the decompilation and
compilation of the Java/smali code is more complex than
processing of other files (e.g., images and other resources).
This explains the longer processing time of the file ‘E’, which
contains more Java code than file ‘F’.
Our tests were performed using a very low performance
computer to imitate single purpose devices acting as routers
or access points (e.g., Linux based APs). A more powerful
computer can perform better. E.g., we ran some of the tests
on a notebook based on Intel Core i7-3540 (3GHz) and an
SSD disc – such a setting can reduce the modification times
by about one half.
The speed limitation needs to estimate the ideal speed that
can be achieved constantly. The time needed to process the
package depends on the proportion of the files that need not
be modified (and can be therefore sent directly) and files
that will be (potentially) modified (and will be sent after the
package modification and resigning). The speed also depends
on the size of the Java code that significantly influences the
decompilation and compilation times. Setting the compression
level may introduce another dimension to choose between the
compression level and slowdown in the modification/transfer
speed.
Figure 2 demonstrates one of the performed tests. It rep-
resents the download process of the file ‘F’ in three tested
situations. The green (solid) graph line shows the download
without the proxy, the red (dotted) line shows the download
process when the proxy modifies the file, and the yellow
(dashed) line shows the download process with a modified
file and with the speed limitation enabled. Note that the file
size of the modified file is about 500 kB bigger (the injected
code is accessing local resources/data and transmitting them
to a remote server).
Our speed estimate is conservative and is suitable also for
packages with a larger amount of Java code (like the file ‘E’).
Looking at Figure 2, it is possible to conclude that in this
particular case the download speed could be faster and the
download would still not suffer from the download stall in the
middle.
VII. POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES
The simplest countermeasure is to use the SSL/TLS to
protect the communication (e.g., the HTTPS protocol). The
security issues of SSL/TLS (including possible attacks) are
out of the scope of this paper.
Requesting permissions at run time in newer versions of
Android may reveal undesired hidden functionality of an
application, but only if that feature is active and the user pays
attention to the popping up messages.
The application can check the signing certificate at runtime
(so called certificate pinning) [3]. An attacker could modify the
reference certificate during the repackaging attack, but doing
so automatically would assume a particular process of the
certificate verification in the application.
Y. Zhauniarovich et al. [29] are suggesting the use of a
secondary signature of the APK file that would be added by the
application store. This method requires a trusted certificate of
the store to be available in the Android before the application
installation.
M. Conti et al. introduce OASIS [11], a trusted component
processing sensitive data on behalf of applications. Appli-
cations cannot access data directly, but only via a handle.
Therefore the OASIS system can enforce complex policies
like allowing access to contacts to display them but prohibiting
sending contacts over the Internet (even if Internet access is
generally allowed).
Increasingly popular are anti-decompilation, anti-cracking
and anti-reverse-engineering mechanisms. These can be as
simple as calling one particular method in the Java code (e.g.,
[27]) or more complex (e.g., [22], [28]).
A detection that the APK file was modified and repackaged
can be based on multiple principles. A significant effort has
been spent to detect repackaged APK files in Android markets.
In these cases researchers and providers have a large number
of APK files and analyze their statistical properties, e.g.,
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an arbitrary APK provided at the time of the attack. Without
seeing a particular APK file before, we are able to inject a
prepared code to the application and infect it this way. The
practicality of this attack was demonstrated with a transparent
HTTP proxy in the middle performing an APK tampering on-
the-fly for all HTTP downloaded APK files.
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[26] F. Tchakounté. Permission-based malware detection mechanisms on
Android: Analysis and perspectives. Journal of computer science and
software application, 1(2), Dec 2014.
[27] J. Xu, S. Li, and T. Zhang. Security analysis and protection based
on smali injection for android applications. In X.-h. Sun, W. Qu,
I. Stojmenovic, W. Zhou, Z. Li, H. Guo, G. Min, T. Yang, Y. Wu, and
L. Liu, editors, Algorithms and Architectures for Parallel Processing,
volume 8630 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2014.
[28] W. Yang, Y. Zhang, J. Li, J. Shu, B. Li, W. Hu, and D. Gu. Appspear:
Bytecode decrypting and dex reassembling for packed android malware.
In H. Bos, F. Monrose, and G. Blanc, editors, Research in Attacks,
Intrusions, and Defenses, volume 9404 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science. Springer, 2015.
[29] Y. Zhauniarovich, O. Gadyatskaya, and B. Crispo. DEMO: Enabling
Trusted Stores for Android. In Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer & Communications Security, CCS ’13, 2013.
[30] Y. Zhauniarovich, O. Gadyatskaya, B. Crispo, F. La Spina, and E. Moser.
Fsquadra: Fast detection of repackaged applications. In V. Atluri and
G. Pernul, editors, Data and Applications Security and Privacy XXVIII,
volume 8566 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2014.
[31] M. Zheng, P. P. C. Lee, and J. C. S. Lui. ADAM: an automatic
and extensible platform to stress test Android anti-virus systems. In
Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment -
9th International Conference, DIMVA 2012, Heraklion, Crete, Greece,
July 26-27, 2012, Revised Selected Papers, 2012.
[32] W. Zhou, Y. Zhou, X. Jiang, and P. Ning. Detecting repackaged smart-
phone applications in third-party Android marketplaces. In Proceedings
of the Second ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and
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Fig. 2. The download process of a sample APK file (the game ‘F’). The solid green line shows the download without the proxy, the dotted red line shows
the download process when the proxy does modify the file and the yellow dashed line shows the download process with a modified file and with the speed
limitation enabled.
similarity between code (including the dependency graphs
between method) and resources (typically images) in packages
[32], [19], [12], [30], [24], [17], [10]. The online on-the-fly
attack is modifying the APK file during a particular download
of a user. Focusing on the markets or file repositories does not
solve the problem.
At the side of the Android device the detection can benefit
from the changes the attacker has to do in the APK file. During
the attack some Java code is added, the Android manifest
is modified and the signature is updated with a new private
key and certificate. The injected code depends strongly on the
attacker and her aims. The attacker has to balance the power of
the code and its detectability. The more power of the injected
code the bigger is the size of the new code, the more hooks
appear in the Android Manifest and the more permissions are
required in the Android Manifest. Permission-based malware
detection is common these days [26]. Therefore, requiring too
many powerfull permissions can lead to a quick detection of
an antivirus solution.
In targeted attacks, the attackers do not usually need ex-
cessive permissions and rely on commonly used permissions
to get access to personal data (e.g., READ SMS). The code
is tailor-made and therefore signature based detection using
known malware signature databases is not of a significant help.
In our experiment, we coded two variants of the additional
functionality5. The first was a simple “Hello World” text
appearing from time to time on the screen. The second was a
realistic privacy attack collecting messages, contacts and call
logs, and transmitting these to a web server located in the
5These codes are not available for download.
Internet. We tested both variants with three leading antivirus
solutions and no alert was raised during our tests.
Kirin [14] is a mobile application certification service
used during application installation to check for potentially
dangerous combinations of permissions.
The detection techniques can also focus on the signer. If
the application is new, then the signer cannot be matched
with the previous one as is the case of an application update.
Basically all signers are equal and the operating system itself
has difficulties deciding where a particular application should
be signed by a particular signer or not. A reputation system of
the signers (or of the APK files) can help [20]. The rarer is the
signer or the APK the more suspicious the application is. This
technique requires a community support, but is already used
in some common PC-based antivirus or firewall solutions.
In our implementation of the online on-the-fly attack we
estimate the total new size of the file and then pad the file with
zeros in the ZIP extra fields to match exactly the estimated
file size. The extra fields are used also in normal APK
files. The zipalign utility (a part of the Android Developer
Tools) aligns all uncompressed data in the APK file on 4-
byte boundaries by changing the size of the extra fields. After
applying the zipalign utility the extra fields occupy single
bytes, our implementation is currently adding extra fields in
the order of 10 kB. This can lead to an easy detection. Once
this feature leads to detections a more accurate estimation of
the new file size would be needed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we practically demonstrated new fully auto-
mated offline and on-the-fly attacks on the Android APK for
Android APK on-the-fly tampering
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an arbitrary APK provided at the time of the attack. Without
seeing a particular APK file before, we are able to inject a
prepared code to the application and infect it this way. The
practicality of this attack was demonstrated with a transparent
HTTP proxy in the middle performing an APK tampering on-
the-fly for all HTTP downloaded APK files.
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Fig. 2. The download process of a sample APK file (the game ‘F’). The solid green line shows the download without the proxy, the dotted red line shows
the download process when the proxy does modify the file and the yellow dashed line shows the download process with a modified file and with the speed
limitation enabled.
similarity between code (including the dependency graphs
between method) and resources (typically images) in packages
[32], [19], [12], [30], [24], [17], [10]. The online on-the-fly
attack is modifying the APK file during a particular download
of a user. Focusing on the markets or file repositories does not
solve the problem.
At the side of the Android device the detection can benefit
from the changes the attacker has to do in the APK file. During
the attack some Java code is added, the Android manifest
is modified and the signature is updated with a new private
key and certificate. The injected code depends strongly on the
attacker and her aims. The attacker has to balance the power of
the code and its detectability. The more power of the injected
code the bigger is the size of the new code, the more hooks
appear in the Android Manifest and the more permissions are
required in the Android Manifest. Permission-based malware
detection is common these days [26]. Therefore, requiring too
many powerfull permissions can lead to a quick detection of
an antivirus solution.
In targeted attacks, the attackers do not usually need ex-
cessive permissions and rely on commonly used permissions
to get access to personal data (e.g., READ SMS). The code
is tailor-made and therefore signature based detection using
known malware signature databases is not of a significant help.
In our experiment, we coded two variants of the additional
functionality5. The first was a simple “Hello World” text
appearing from time to time on the screen. The second was a
realistic privacy attack collecting messages, contacts and call
logs, and transmitting these to a web server located in the
5These codes are not available for download.
Internet. We tested both variants with three leading antivirus
solutions and no alert was raised during our tests.
Kirin [14] is a mobile application certification service
used during application installation to check for potentially
dangerous combinations of permissions.
The detection techniques can also focus on the signer. If
the application is new, then the signer cannot be matched
with the previous one as is the case of an application update.
Basically all signers are equal and the operating system itself
has difficulties deciding where a particular application should
be signed by a particular signer or not. A reputation system of
the signers (or of the APK files) can help [20]. The rarer is the
signer or the APK the more suspicious the application is. This
technique requires a community support, but is already used
in some common PC-based antivirus or firewall solutions.
In our implementation of the online on-the-fly attack we
estimate the total new size of the file and then pad the file with
zeros in the ZIP extra fields to match exactly the estimated
file size. The extra fields are used also in normal APK
files. The zipalign utility (a part of the Android Developer
Tools) aligns all uncompressed data in the APK file on 4-
byte boundaries by changing the size of the extra fields. After
applying the zipalign utility the extra fields occupy single
bytes, our implementation is currently adding extra fields in
the order of 10 kB. This can lead to an easy detection. Once
this feature leads to detections a more accurate estimation of
the new file size would be needed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we practically demonstrated new fully auto-
mated offline and on-the-fly attacks on the Android APK for
Android APK on-the-fly tampering
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